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Abstract
Conditional Access (CA) is widely used by pay-television operators to restrict ac-
cess to content to authorised subscribers. Commercial CA solutions are available
for structured broadcast and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) environments, as
well as Internet-based video-on-demand services, however these solutions are mostly
proprietary, often inefficient for use on IP networks, and frequently depend on smart-
cards for maintaining security.
An efficient, flexible, and open conditional access system that can be implemented
practically by operators with large numbers of subscribers would be beneficial to
those operators and Set-Top-Box manufacturers in terms of cost savings for royalties
and production costs. Furthermore, organisations such as the South African Broad-
casting Corporation that are transitioning to Digital-Terrestrial-Television could use
an open Conditional Access System (CAS) to restrict content to viewing within na-
tional borders and to ensure that only valid TV licence holders are able to access
content.
To this end, a system was developed that draws from the area of group key manage-
ment. Users are grouped according to their subscription selections and these groups
are authorised for each selection’s constituent services. Group keys are updated with
a key-tree based approach that includes a novel method for growing full trees that
outperforms the standard method. The relations that are created between key trees
are used to establish a hierarchy of keys which allows flexible selection of services
whilst maintaining their cryptographic protection. Conditions for security without
dependence on smartcards are defined, and the system is expandable to multi-home
viewing scenarios.
A prototype implementation was used to assess the proposed system. Total memory
consumption of the key-server, bandwidth usage for transmission of key updates, and
client processing and storage of keys were all demonstrated to be highly scalable with
number of subscribers and number of services.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis Statement
In the television industry, Conditional Access (CA) [8] is the application of cryp-
tography for controlling access to content. The term CA is most commonly used in
reference to the traditional scheduled programming that is distributed over digital
broadcast mediums such as satellite, terrestrial, and cable.
Pay-television (or premium television) content, which consists primarily of high
quality video and audio streams, is by its nature a high-bandwidth application.
Traditional television broadcast networks have limited bandwidth and typically it is
infeasible to encrypt the data stream with a different key for each valid subscriber.
In recent years, increasing availability of fast home broadband connections has al-
lowed the advent of Internet Video-On-Demand (VOD) services such as Netflix1
which do establish individual network connections (unicast) to clients. This type
of application is reportedly responsible for a large percentage of global bandwidth
usage, placing a strain on distribution networks. Unicast distribution of “live televi-
sion” (including scheduled programming) to a large number of receivers is extremely
inefficient. Multicast facilitates efficient distribution of this type of content over IP
networks [9].
Pay-TV operators are heavily reliant on conditional access systems to support their
business model. Conditional Access Systems (CASs) are also used for Free-To-View
(FTV) television broadcasts. FTV is distinct from Free-To-Air (FTA) systems in
which the broadcast content is not encrypted at all. Encryption of FTV content
1http://www.netflix.com/
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can be for reasons such as restricting access to content by physical region. National
borders, for example — to prevent viewers in nearby countries from accessing content
that is ultimately paid for by tax-payers. Within a country, regional boundaries
might also be defined on the basis of broadcast licenses and advertising.
In the near future, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) will be
following in the footsteps of its counterparts around the world (including the United
States of America, United Kingdom, and Australia) in switching over2 to Digital
Terrestrial Television (DTT). The benefits of digital television include greater effi-
ciency in usage of the radio spectrum, and better picture quality. The SABC could
use a CA system to limit access to within South Africa, or for ensuring that only
valid TV-licence holders are able to watch TV.
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
This research was inspired in part by the need of a South African Set-Top-Box
(STB) manufacturer for an open, royalty-free conditional access mechanism for In-
ternet Protocol Television (IPTV) [16] that is based on results from research in
cryptographic key management. The objective of this research therefore is to study
existing research in key management systems and design and implement an end-to-
end framework for conditional access that is both theoretically robust and practically
implementable.
Existing commercial CA systems are closed, and proprietary. To the best of our
knowledge, while there is much research in the area of group key management,
there is little available research that specifically addresses the design of a complete
conditional access system for IPTV.
Furthermore, some existing conditional access systems rely on “security by obscu-
rity”. That is, the strength of their security is dependant on an attacker not having
knowledge of the workings of the system. For example, a subscriber’s viewing se-
lection might be enforced by software disallowing certain services. A restriction
enforced in this way can be bypassed by an attacker who implements their own
receiver system. Kerckhoffs’ principle [23] should be applied so that an attacker
having knowledge of the algorithms used should not compromise the security of the
system. Therefore there is arguably room for improvement in terms of security of
the existing approaches.
2SABC DTT migration: http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/SABC/dtt
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CA systems used in some IPTV deployments are based on Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM) mechanisms [4], use a simple key distribution centre (SKDC) approach,
or encapsulate broadcast CA systems in IP packets. There is room for improvement
in terms of efficiency relative to these approaches by specifically tailoring a solution
to the IP multicast distribution mechanism.
1.3 Contributions
The core achievement of this research is the design of a framework that can be used
as the basis for a conditional access system. In order to address this larger objective
of how to build a conditional access system, the following research questions were
posed.
How best can existing research in key management techniques be com-
bined to provide a flexible and practical conditional access system for
IPTV?
This research considers the scalability and efficiency problems that are encountered
when attempting to securely deliver content to a large group of authorised sub-
scribers. A survey and assessment is made of techniques in group key refreshment
and distribution, reliable key delivery, and secure storage of keys.
The proposed conditional access system uses an efficient key-tree based method for
sharing a group key and associated updates with a large group of subscribers. This
method attempts to minimize overhead related to key management in terms of pro-
cessing, memory usage, and bandwidth. The CA system includes a fast technique,
which we believe to be novel in this application, for growing full key trees that
reduces the amount of data to be sent for a key update.
Multiple services are supported by using a hierarchical key structure for grouping
subscribers according to their viewing selections. This structure defines a relation-
ship between key trees that enables flexible viewing selections to be cryptographi-
cally enforced. In order to improve upon the poor scalability of existing techniques,
service groupings known as bouquets are incorporated to accommodate a large num-
ber of services.
3
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Can an adaptable conditional access solution be found that is secure
without the need for smartcards?
Most existing television delivery environments rely on a smartcard being held by
each subscriber. The smartcard is used as an identity module and as a tamper-
resistant device for storing cryptographic keys. This dependence restricts the type
of devices to which content can be delivered. To support devices such as mobile
phones and tablets, it is necessary to negotiate and store keys securely without the
need for a smartcard.
The proposed system specifies a protocol for sharing a secret key between a key-
server and a receiver device. Furthermore, requirements for the secure storage of keys
in the non-volatile memory of the receiver device are defined. These requirements
assume the availability of a trusted platform.
Can the solution be extended to allow sharing of media content in an
authorised domain?
Increasingly, users want the flexibility to view content on multiple devices through-
out their households. We propose an extension to the aforementioned service group-
ing structure that supports multiple viewing devices attached to a single subscription
without compromising cryptographic strength of the system.
1.4 Notation and Terminology
The following notation indicates transmission of a message m by server s to user u,
encrypted with key k:
s→ u : 〈m〉k
The notation is extended to indicate transmission to multiple users and a message
with multiple components. The message might be broadcast or multicast. The
list of users is those for whom it is intended, although due to the nature of these
routing mechanisms, there is no guarantee that they receive it, or that others do
not. Security is therefore ensured by the use of encryption:
s→ u1, u2 : 〈m1,m2〉k
4
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Throughout this thesis, the term subscriber will be used interchangeably with user,
client, and receiver. Unless otherwise specified this indicates a receiver of content
that is transmitted by a server and is not intended to imply any specific business
relationship (eg. paid subscription) unless otherwise indicated. Client is used in the
context of a client/server relationship.
The term server will primarily refer to a key management and distribution server
as part of the complete head-end. Head-end refers to the operator’s equipment
that is used for processing and delivering a television broadcast. This includes
encrypting elementary audio and video streams, multiplexing them and including
other necessary data, and uplinking to satellite.
In digital television, service is used to refer to a particular stream of content pro-
gramming. In common usage this is referred to as a television “channel”. Channel
more properly refers to the particular means of transmission – for example a radio
frequency.
Operators often define bouquets which are logical groupings of services. These are
most often used as atomic subscription units — that is, groupings such as “Movies”,
“Sport”, or “Documentaries”. These groupings are not necessarily non-overlapping:
a service might be in multiple bouquets, thus allows groupings such as “Compact”
and “Premium”.
Where set notation is used, A ∩ B means the intersection of sets A and B. An
element is contained in A ∩ B if and only if it is contained in set A and set B.
A ⊆ B means that A is a possibly-equal subset of B. A \ B means the set of
elements that are present in set A but not in set B.
5
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1.5 Outline
This section provides a brief outline of the remainder of this thesis.
Chapter 2 covers general background information on television distribution, and
digital pay television in particular. An overview of networking, cryptography, and
secure communications is provided.
In Chapter 3 a detailed assessment of cryptographic group key management and ac-
cess control techniques is undertaken with consideration for the specific requirements
of a conditional access system for IPTV.
Chapter 4 outlines the design of the proposed conditional access system for this
research. The results obtained with a prototype implementation of the system are
presented and evaluated in Chapter 5, and finally the conclusion in Chapter 6 dis-
cusses the outcomes of this research and highlights areas for further work.
6
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Television Distribution
Television is an integral part of the fabric of modern society. It has been widely
available for the better part of a century, and has become established as a primary
medium for the distribution of news and entertainment. It provides a means for or-
ganisations such as governments and corporations to reach large audiences efficiently
and effectively. The role television has played in forming public opinion since the
mid-twentieth century cannot be understated. It is a technology that has truly made
the world a smaller place.
Historically, television has been broadcast to viewers by means of terrestrial radio
transmissions and cable networks. The advent of telecommunications satellites in
the 1960s and 70s saw the introduction of “direct-to-home” satellite television broad-
casts. Satellite television is highly scalable as it does not require the installation
and maintenance of complex infrastructure to support additional viewers. Satellite
broadcasts can cover vast areas that would be impractical or uneconomical to service
with cable or terrestrial broadcasts. Viewers only need to be supplied with low-cost
receiving equipment: a STB attached to a parabolic satellite dish.
2.2 Internet Protocol Television
Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) refers to the delivery of television content over
an IP network. It is distinct from video content provided by Internet services such
7
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as Youtube, Netflix, and Hulu (although the security principles described in this
thesis could be applied to some of these services). Montpetit et al. [27] provide a
comprehensive overview of the current technologies, practices, and trends involved
in the delivery of IPTV content. Their overview includes a discussion of IP multicast
and related transport protocols.
2.2.1 Multicast Networking
An IP network is packet-switched. This means that messages are broken up into
packets and routed from a source to a destination either directly on a local network
segment, or via intermediate routers. The three primary schemes for routing these
packets are unicast, broadcast, and multicast. Unicast refers to a packet being sent to
a single destination. Figure 2.1a shows an example where sender S transmits a single
packet that is intended for the single destination (highlighted). The packet is routed
across network segments to reach the destination. Broadcast involves simultaneous
delivery to all destinations on a local network segment. The example in Figure 2.1b
shows S sending a single packet that is delivered to all destinations on the same
network segment as S, whether they want it or not. Multicast involves simultaneous
delivery of the packet to a particular set of destinations who have registered an
interest in receiving them by joining a particular multicast group. In Figure 2.1c
the single packet that is transmitted by S is received by those destinations that have
told their closest router about their interest in it.
The important factor is that broadcast, and particularly multicast, are features im-
plemented by the network infrastructure. The source host transmits a single packet
that is delivered to multiple destinations by the network switching and routing equip-
ment. This significantly reduces the load on the source host and the network that
would otherwise be required to transmit the packet separately to each destination
by the successive or simultaneous establishment of multiple unicast connections [34].
Broadcast is a feature implemented in IPv4 but not available in IPv6 [11], and is
primarily restricted to local networks and associated technologies. It makes use of a
specific broadcast address. Packets sent to this address will be received by all hosts
on a particular network segment. Broadcast traffic is not routed outside of Local
Area Network (LAN) segments because it causes tremendous load on receiving hosts
and the network, even if they are not interested in receiving the packets.
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S
S Source
Host
Dest
Router
(a) Unicast
S
(b) Broadcast
S
(c) Multicast
Figure 2.1: Packet routing strategies. With unicast, a packet is routed from a
source to a single destination. With broadcast, a packet is simultaneously delivered
to all hosts on the same network segment. With multicast, a packet is simultaneously
delivered to all interested hosts.
Broadcast Unicast Multicast Return Channel
Satellite X 7
Terrestrial X 7
Cable X X(some)
IPTV X X X
Table 2.1: Comparison of Television Transmission Methods. This table highlights
the in-band features of common transmission methods. Specifically, out-of-band
return channels via Internet connections, for example, are not considered as they
require completely separate transmission systems.
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We distinguish between IP broadcast/multicast and television broadcasting by satel-
lite or terrestrial radio signals. Conceptually, broadcast of information by radio sig-
nals to all listening receivers is similar. However it is a highly efficient and scalable
use of radio technologies to distribute from a single transmitting source to multi-
ple receivers, all of which are interested in receiving the signal (assuming they are
powered-on and tuned to the correct frequency).
An IP network has broader, more general applications than over-the-air television
networks. Typically it is not dedicated to television delivery and the assumption
cannot be made that all hosts want to receive all packets. IP multicast facilitates
efficient use of the network infrastructure.
Clients indicate the groups they are interested in by communicating with their near-
est router using the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [9] on IPv4 net-
works and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) [10] on IPv6 networks. This router
in turn communicates with other routers, and so they build up routing tables that
ensure only relevant traffic passes through them. Groups are identified by specific
IP addresses. The range of IPv4 addresses that is allocated to multicast is from
224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255. In IPv6 the ff00::/8 address block is used.
Data is usually sent to a multicast group using User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
datagrams. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is not applicable to multicast
traffic as it only supports two-way, one-to-one connections as opposed to UDP which
allows for point to multipoint transmission.
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is commonly used [27], encapsulated in
UDP datagrams, for delivering streaming media content. It defines various profiles
for different types of content. RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) is a complementary
protocol primarily used by receiving clients to communicate statistics back to the
server that it can use to tune its output (such as quality-of-service and rate limiting
parameters). Secure RTP (SRTP) [5] is a particular profile defined by RTP for
encryption, integrity verification, and message authentication. It uses Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) with a counter stream cipher mode of operation.
2.2.2 Return Path
Satellite and terrestrial television distribution networks offer purely one-way data
transmission. That is, they do not provide any in-band mechanism for return com-
munication from the viewer to the operator (head-end).
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A return-path (or return-channel) is a communications channel that the receiver
may use to transmit data to the head-end. The lack of a return path places certain
limitations on the type of services that can be offered on these networks (for example,
proper video-on-demand, which is described further in Section 2.3.3). The routing
strategies and return path features offered by the various television transmission
methods are summarised in Table 2.1.
As the scope of this research is directed at IPTV, it primarily considers the situation
where a permanent return-path is available. This allows for the assumption to be
made that a reliable unicast fallback mechanism is available for a client to request
keys. Apart from IPTV, modern cable television deployments include two-way com-
munications, and satellite and terrestrial broadcast systems can be augmented with
separate return channels (for example, a satellite-IP hybrid set-top-box). Such a hy-
brid system is useful for countries such as South Africa, where broadband Internet
access is currently limited in terms of bandwidth and data usage caps.
2.3 Pay Television
The primary application of conditional access is to protect the delivery networks of
pay-television operators. An operator may offer content and services to customers
in various ways including subscriptions, “pay-per-view”, and video-on-demand. The
Conditional Access system that they use must be able to accommodate these differ-
ent options.
2.3.1 Subscription
The pay television industry operates a predominantly subscription based business
model. They are funded partly or fully by paying subscribers, as opposed to adver-
tising revenue, or public-funding. This allows a broader selection of service content
types to cater to viewers’ interests. Subscriptions allow access to scheduled pro-
gramming that is available from a selection of services.
2.3.2 Pay-per-view
Pay-Per-View (PPV) is a service which might be offered by pay television operators
to existing subscribers or once-off customers who have the necessary equipment
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to receive the transmission. All viewers tune-in at a scheduled time to receive the
broadcast, which is typically of a special event or sports match. PPV can be thought
of as a very short-term subscription.
2.3.3 Video-on-demand
Video-on-demand (VOD) is a service that allows viewers to individually choose con-
tent from a selection and watch it at their leisure. This is achieved in different ways,
depending on the transmission mechanism being used. In a pure broadcast environ-
ment, Push-Video-On-Demand (PVOD) requires a subscriber to have a device with
a local storage capability such as a Digital Video Recorder (DVR) with a hard disk.
A selection of content is background downloaded from a dedicated broadcast channel
and saved to the disk. Once some content is available on the disk, the subscriber is
able to view it at their convenience. With “true” VOD, content is streamed directly
from a server via a unicast connection.
2.4 Content Protection
In many forms of communications all parties share at least some interest in maintain-
ing the security of said communications. Content protection, however, is primarily
aimed at protecting the interests of service operators and media copyright holders.
Thus there is little incentive for customers to take steps to maintain security, and
when these steps are enforced on legitimate customers they are seen as an unwel-
come hindrance (particularly in the case of DRM applied to media such as music
and books — i.e. outside the confines of a controlled distribution network). Addi-
tionally, the trend is towards consumers being able to access media across a variety
of devices at any time — for example, a consumer might wish to watch a show on
a television in the comfort of their lounge, or on a mobile device when travelling.
Content protection mechanisms should avoid preventing consumers from having the
convenient access to media that they desire, or the consumers might resort to ille-
gitimate methods of obtaining the media that enable to them consume it freely.
It is both pragmatic and prudent for operators and vendors of content protection
systems to work on the assumption that the system can never be completely secure.
Given enough time and resources, any system can be broken.
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The goal therefore is to ensure that the cost of breaking the system is more expen-
sive than using it legitimately would be. It should be more costly and/or onerous
for potential customers to attempt to avoid paying for a subscription than to simply
pay. Particularly, it should not be possible for illegitimate efforts to piggyback on
the legitimate network. For example, an operation that attempts a pirate redistri-
bution of the service for commercial gain should not be able to make use of the
operator’s distribution network. This is a problem with over-the-air transmissions
via terrestrial and satellite where cloning smartcards or sharing decryption keys ob-
tained from legitimate subscriptions are often the only steps necessary to set up an
illegal commercial operation [28, 47].
If some part of the content distribution network is vulnerable, the strength of other
areas is irrelevant. The primary weakness in any such system is at the point where,
by necessity, the content must be decrypted in order for customers to view it. This
is addressed by employing an end-to-end chain of trust. The data is transmitted se-
curely by the CA schemes discussed in this thesis. The receiving device (STB) then
sends it to a television via an encrypted signal using the HDCP (High-bandwidth
Digital Content Protection) protocol, where the source device cryptographically
authenticates the destination device before sending the data. The destination (tele-
vision) displays the content. In theory the only way to extract the content would
be to record a lower quality version via analogue device outputs. The high quality
digital data is encrypted from its source at the operator all the way to the TV.
2.4.1 Conditional Access
In order to enforce their business model, pay TV operators need some way of re-
stricting access to their content to only paid-up subscribers. In early cable TV
systems, access could be restricted by using signal filters at the cable taps for each
subscribers’ premises to remove certain channels from their signal. This method
was not scalable with an increase in the number of channels and subscribers (due
to the large number of signal filters and locations involved) and it was relatively
easy to work around the filters illegitimately. Alternative methods such as distort-
ing or scrambling the signal with interference signals were used, but these could
also be bypassed. The advent of digital television allowed solutions using encryp-
tion and associated key management schemes to be applied to the problem. These
cryptographic approaches are at the core of current conditional access solutions.
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2.4.2 Digital Rights Management
Digital rights management (DRM) and conditional access aim to achieve similar
goals: namely the protection of content that is ultimately distributed to untrusted
users. DRM is a widely applicable term that refers to any mechanism for restricting
the use of content or hardware.
Azad et al. [4] provide an overview of research in DRM. Broadly, DRM associates
content with a set of usage rights and protects both the content and the rights,
usually by cryptographic means. It attempts to associate a unique copy of some
content with a specific authorised user. Each authorised user would receive their
own copy of the content. This is done in such a way that a user should only be
able to access his/her own copy of the content, and then only in the manner defined
by the provider of the content. For DRM to be effective, only trusted hardware or
software should be able to decrypt and interpret the rights, and provide a user with
access to the content only if the rights and additional authorisation information
permit doing so.
DRM aims to restrict the use of content that is distributed or distributable outside
the confines of a controlled system (i.e. an untrusted distribution channel). Condi-
tional access is part of a more tightly controllable system and aims to protect the
distribution network itself. It is distinct from DRM in that it attempts to protect a
single copy of content that is shared by all users [27].
2.5 Digital Video Broadcasting
The Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Project1 defines a comprehensive set of open
standards that are widely used in Europe, Australia, Africa and other parts of the
world for the broadcast of digital television2. They specify most aspects of digital
television to allow interoperability and compatibility between networks and equip-
ment. For example, the DVB-S standard [14] specifies modulation, encoding and
transmission characteristics, and data formats and protocols for satellite television.
The newer DVB-IPTV [16] includes specifications for the use of protocols such as
RTSP and RTP, and multicast networking.
1http://www.dvb.org
2Whilst DVB is used widely, similar competing standards are in use elsewhere: the Advanced
Television Systems Committee (ATSC) standards in North America; and the Integrated Services
Digital Broadcasting (ISDB) standards in parts of Asia and South America.
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The standards also define the DVB Conditional Access framework (DVB-CA) [7, 8]
that allows operators to use various commercial conditional access solutions. Major
vendors of such solutions include Irdeto3, NDS4 and Nagravision5. These systems
are typically closed, and proprietary, with almost no information publicly available
on the exact mechanisms that are used to achieve the required objectives.
In DVB-CA video is scrambled with a control word (CW) which is used as a seed
to a pseudorandom number generator. Either the common scrambling algorithm
(DVB-CSA [17]) or optionally some variant of it is used, as decided by the vendor
of the particular conditional access system. The subscribers’ receiving equipment
needs a compatible descrambler.
The CW is common for all subscribers of the system and is changed often (every few
seconds) to minimize the impact of key discovery. A relatively small key size is used
to allow real-time descrambling on relatively constrained embedded systems. This
key is potentially vulnerable to brute force and side-channel attacks [24, 44]. Newer
versions of DVB-CSA which take faster hardware into account provide stronger
AES-based encryption.
The DVB-CA standard specifies the existence of Entitlement Control Messages
(ECMs), which contain CW updates, and Entitlement Management Messages (EMMs)
which contain other instructions and key updates for the CA system. These mes-
sages are opaque, and usually encrypted, with their format and content specific
to the particular conditional access system in use. They are decrypted and pro-
cessed by the CA system, which must ensure that it provides a control word to the
descrambler in a timely fashion.
Any mechanism that fits into this specification can be used to securely deliver the
CWs. In the most simplistic system, the CA system might store a static, globally
shared master key in smartcards (which are tamper resistant). This key would use
symmetric cryptography to decrypt the control words. The impact of this single
key being compromised is severe because it could be widely distributed, thereby
resulting in a complete break of the system.
More complex systems will encrypt the CW with an intermediate key-encryption-key
(KEK). The intermediate KEK is usually stored on authorised smartcards and peri-
odically updated using a message encrypted with a smartcard’s public key. One such
3Irdeto B.V. http://www.irdeto.com/
4NDS Limited. http://www.nds.com/
5Nagravision SA. http://www.nagravision.com/
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message would need to be delivered per smartcard in circulation. The performance
and bandwidth requirements scale linearly O(n) with this approach, sometimes re-
ferred to as as Simple Key Distribution Centre. Even more advanced systems employ
hierarchies of keys that allow securely delivering these keys in a more efficient man-
ner.
It should be noted that the use of a control word allows flexibility in the system:
it can be updated very frequently without incurring further rekey operations; it
facilitates the “modular” interchange of CA systems; and in fact it allows multiple
CA systems to be used simultaneously, with an ECM for each system containing the
same control word (this is known as SimulCrypt [15]).
2.6 Secure Network Communications
This section provides a general overview of the principles of secure network commu-
nications between a sender and a receiver. The same principles can be applied to
multicast communications and specifically for the pay-TV scenario where there is a
single sender but multiple receivers.
2.6.1 Attacks and Vulnerabilities
Before attempting to secure a system, it is necessary to have an understanding of the
types of threats to which the system could possibly be subjected. The International
Telecommunication Un on (ITU) X.800 Recommendation [21] defines a security ar-
chitecture that specifies categories of security services and classification of attacks
on the security of a system.
In normal communications, a message is passed from a sender to a receiver. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.2a where Alice sends a message to Bob. It may pass through
multiple intermediaries (network routers) along the way. Attacks by a third party,
Eve, on this data flow can be classified as either active or passive. In a passive
attack, the message arrives at the receiver unmodified from the form in which it left
the sender. In an active attack the message that is received is altered, fabricated,
or not received at all.
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Interception is a passive attack on data confidentiality. Figure 2.2b shows Eve is
able to read a copy of the message that is intended only for Bob. This is done
without affecting Bob’s receipt of the message.
Interruption is an active attack on availability. Figure 2.2c shows that some action
taken by Eve prevents Bob from ever receiving the message sent by Alice.
Modification is an active attack on data integrity. In Figure 2.2d, Eve is able to
receive the message that is sent by Alice and modify it before sending it on
to Bob. Bob is unaware that the message he receives is changed from the one
sent by Alice.
Fabrication is an active attack on authenticity. Eve is able to create a message
that appears to originate from Alice, and send it to Bob. This is shown in
Figure 2.2e.
Alice Bob
Eve
(a) Normal flow
(b) Interception (Passive) (c) Interruption (Active)
(d) Modification (Active) (e) Fabrication (Active)
Figure 2.2: Possible forms of attack on a message sent from Alice to Bob. Eve is
the attacker.
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2.6.2 Security Objectives and Services
Information security has certain objectives that need to be met dependant on the
requirements of the particular application. These desirable properties known as secu-
rity services are implemented by various underlying mechanisms and protocols [40].
Confidentiality
Confidentiality ensures that information is only disclosed to authorised recipients.
An attacker eavesdropping on a network will not be able to read the information.
It is protection against interception attacks.
In the context of pay-TV, confidentiality is required to ensure that only authorised
subscribers are able to access content.
Integrity
Integrity is the ability to ensure that the data received is unchanged from what
was sent. It provides protection against modification attacks and against accidental
corruption of data that might occur in transit.
Availability
A system must remain available to those for whom it is intended. Denial-of-service
and interruption are attacks against availability.
Authentication
Authentication is the process of one entity verifying the identity of another — check-
ing they are who they claim to be. Authentication might be conducted mutually or
in one direction only. It protects against fabrication attacks.
For example, the pay-TV operator needs to authenticate subscribers (specifically
their receiving device) to associate them with a valid subscription.
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Access Control
Access control restricts who can join a network or make use of a service. Once
a user is authenticated, it grants them access in accordance with their associated
authorisations.
Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation is the ability of a system to ensure that a user cannot deny involve-
ment in communications that have been sent or received and acknowledged.
In the context of business systems, such a service would be required to prove that a
customer placed an order, for example.
2.7 Cryptography
Provision of the aforementioned security services is primarily accomplished by per-
forming certain transformations to the data before sending it, and again once it
has been received. These transformations make use of cryptography and are usually
achieved with the use of keys. The security of a system depends on the restricted
availability and careful distribution of these keys. For example, a message is en-
crypted with a secret key to provide confidentiality and only parties who hold the
appropriate secret key for decryption will be able to understand the message. This
management and distribution of cryptographic keys is a core function of a condi-
tional access system.
2.7.1 Symmetric Cryptography
With symmetric cryptography, the same secret key is used to decrypt the data as
was used to encrypt it [36]. Block ciphers such as DES (Data Encryption Stan-
dard) [1] and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [2] are examples of symmetric
cryptography.
The primary issue with symmetric cryptography is finding a way to securely dis-
tribute the secret key to all concerned parties. If the secret key is intercepted, the
encryption is worthless.
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Various methods of secure key distribution exist. A key might be pre-shared between
a group of users (for example, by physically entering the same password into multiple
computers, or loaded onto a STB during production in the factory). Alternatively
some key exchange protocol might be used. For example, the Diffie-Hellman key
establishment protocol [12] allows two parties to securely negotiate a symmetric
key over an insecure channel. Even if all of the communication is intercepted, an
eavesdropper will not be able to determine the negotiated key.
2.7.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography (also known as public/private key cryptography) uses a
separate key for the encryption and decryption steps [20]. Encryption is typically
performed with a public key which can be widely distributed without concern for
security. Only the holder of the private key is able to decrypt the message. RSA [35]
is a widely used example of an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm.
Asymmetric cryptography is significantly slower than symmetric and is only suitable
for encrypting small amounts of data. Often communications protocols might start
with asymmetric cryptography to share a symmetric “session key” which is then
used for the remainder of the communications. An initial exchange of public keys
allows the parties to encrypt messages that can only be read by the other.
Assume E is an encryption function, and D a decryption function. In practice
these functions might be the same, depending on the encryption algorithm. Given a
keypair {Kr, Ku} where Kr is the private key and Ku is the associated public key, a
message m can be encrypted to produce ciphertext c = E(Ku,m). Decryption with
the public key is as follows m = D(Kr, c).
Asymmetric cryptography can also be used to sign messages to achieve authentica-
tion. A message m is signed by generating a hash or checksum h with a hash-function
H (eg. MD5, SHA). h is then encrypted with the private key Kr to produce a sig-
nature s = E(Kr, s). Anyone holding the public key Ku can decrypt the signature
to obtain h and then apply H to the message m1 that they received to obtain h1.
If h = h1 then the receiver is assured that the message has not been altered since it
was created by the sender. Only the sender who holds the private key can generate
signatures that will authenticate in this way.
20
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
2.7.3 Trusted Third Party to Establish Authentication
Unless two parties have communicated in some way and shared some secret infor-
mation known only to each of them, it is usually necessary to make use of a trusted
third-party for authentication (that is, for one or both of the parties to verify that
the other is who it claims to be).
This service is normally provided by a certification authority [22]. Such an authority
will cryptographically sign a certificate containing the public key of a party whose
identity they can verify in some way. That certificate can then be used in future
exchanges with unknown entities, who are able to verify it using the public key of
the certification authority.
Authorities can verify other authorities, who in turn verify users. If a user trusts a
particular authority, then he implicitly trusts another authority trusted by the first,
and so on. A Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), which comprises the mechanisms
and systems necessary to enable the use of digital certificates, provides this chain-
of-trust.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an overview of the technologies involved in digital
television transmission and introduced the need by operators to protect this digital
content. In Section 2.1 we discussed traditional television distribution via terres-
trial, cable, and satellite broadcasting. In Section 2.2, IPTV was introduced as a
versatile medium for distributing media content to a variety of devices. Multicast,
the networking routing mechanism that enable scalable IPTV implementations, was
discussed in Section 2.2.1 and compared to the traditional methods of broadcast-
ing. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, the particular use cases of pay-television and the need
for content protection were outlined. The Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Stan-
dards and the structure they define for supporting Conditional Access schemes was
described in Section 2.5. Finally, in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, the principles for secure
communications over an untrusted network were introduced as a set of distinct se-
curity services that protect against particular categories of threats. These services
can be implemented by the application of cryptography.
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Chapter 3
Group Key Management
3.1 Conditional Access Requirements
Primarily, a conditional access system needs to ensure that only legitimate users
are able to access content, and that they are only able to access the content they
are authorised to receive. That is, it must protect content from outsiders who have
no subscription, and it must protect against subscribers being able to illegitimately
elevate their access privileges. A conditional access system must reasonably support
an operator with tens to hundreds of services, and millions of subscribers. The
system needs to scale well in these ranges.
We might assume1 that a single high-definition (HD) television service requires an
average 12 Mbit/s for a suitable quality video stream. An associated 6-channel
surround sound audio stream might have a bitrate of 320 kbit/s. A satellite television
transponder with a maximum effective bandwidth of 64 Mbit/s would therefore be
able to transmit a maximum of 5 such HD television services. Transponders are
costly and steps are taken to maximise the number of services that can be delivered
on one. Although other transmission mediums such as cable or IP networks have
higher available bandwidth, it is not unlimited. In IP networks, bandwidth usage
costs are often the burden of the end-user. A CA system should therefore attempt
to minimise the data transfer overhead that it imposes.
With these requirements in mind, and to provide the security services that were
outlined in Section 2.6.2, a method of sharing keys amongst a large group of users is
1Assumptions are based on the use of MPEG-4 AVC/H.264 video compression and AC-3 audio
compression: http://www.avchd-info.org/format/
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required. Group key management is the area of research that addresses the problems
of key management and secure distribution that were highlighted in Section 2.7 with
respect to a group of users.
The goal is to securely share appropriate keys amongst the authorised subscribers
so that they are able to decrypt the content. The mechanism by which the keys
are shared needs to be secure against collusion between users, and it must provide
forward and backward secrecy. Forward secrecy means that when a subscriber is
removed, they are not able to access content that is transmitted in future [33].
Backward secrecy means a new subscriber will not be able to access content that was
transmitted prior to their joining. For example, an unauthorised user might capture
encrypted transmissions for some period of time (without holding a subscription).
He could then take out a subscription with the sole intention of obtaining decryption
keys and then cancel the subscription immediately. Without backward secrecy, he
could then decrypt all the previously captured content, with ut having paid for it.
In Section 3.2, the concept of a hierarchy of keys is introduced as the basis for
encryption of video content. Various different methods for efficiently updating a
shared group key are surveyed and assessed in Section 3.3. The problem of securing
multiple services so that subscribers only have access to what they have paid for
is addressed in Section 3.4. Reliable delivery of key update messages, and fallback
mechanisms for clients to recover from missed keys are discussed in Section 3.5.
Significant reductions in bandwidth usage can be had from updating keys in batches.
An overview is given in Section 3.6. Finally, solutions to the problem of secure key
storage without a smartcard are considered in Section 3.7.
3.2 Secure Broadcasting
In the pay-television scenario, a single source (the head-end server) needs to trans-
mit a large amount of data simultaneously to a large number of receivers (the sub-
scribers). The data transmission is continuous, which is known as streaming, and
consists of video and audio streams, and other supporting information such as an
electronic program guide (EPG). It is measured in terms of bandwidth requirements
(transfer rate), rather than total data size.
In a typical over-the-air (OTA) broadcast network (such as satellite and terrestrial
television), it is necessary to encrypt this data because it is otherwise impossible to
control access to it. Anyone who can acquire or fabricate the necessary reception
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equipment could intercept the transmission [28, 47]. On a cable or IP network,
although the subscriber’s connection and access is controllable by the network op-
erator, encryption is also highly desirable to protect against interception attacks.
Such attacks are very possible over large public networks such as the Internet or by
means of illegal taps into private cable networks. Such taps are difficult to detect
due to the networks’ size.
It should be clear that attempting to secure this data transmission using the previ-
ously discussed mechanisms for two-party communications would require a separate
encrypted video stream for each individual subscriber. So while that would meet the
security requirements for controlling subscriber access, it is an extremely inefficient
use of limited and costly bandwidth.
3.2.1 Hierarchy of Keys
An efficient solution to securely transmitting the video data stream is to encrypt
it only once and then send it to all subscribers. It is necessary to securely share
the key used to encrypt the video stream with all subscribers. The data encryption
key can itself be encrypted with a private “key-encryption-key” (KEK). If a key ki,
is associated with each subscriber ui, and known only to that subscriber and the
server, then the data encryption key can be securely transmitted to all subscribers.
The data encryption key that is shared amongst the entire group of subscribers is
called a group key (GK). The messages that the key server would send to distribute
a message and the associated group key are shown in Figure 3.1. This 2-level key
hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.2.
s→ u1, u2, . . . , un : 〈m〉GK
s→ u1 : 〈GK〉k1
...
s→ un : 〈GK〉kn
Figure 3.1: Basic protocol for distribution of a message m, encrypted with group
key GK to users u1 . . . un. For each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, GK is encrypted with
the private key ki known only to s and user ui.
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u6 u8u5u4 u7
GK
u1 u3u2
k3k2k1 k7k6k5k4 k8
Figure 3.2: Illustration of a 2-level key structure
3.2.2 DVB Key Hierarchy
In the DVB-CA system, the actual key used to encrypt the streamed data is known
as a Control Word (CW) (see Section 2.5 for more details about the DVB standards).
The group key could be used as the CW directly, provided that it meets the standard
format for DVB descrambler equipment. However, in the interests of flexibility it
makes sense to introduce a third level in the key hierarchy. The CA mechanism is
therefore not limited by descrambler hardware specifications that use a small key
size. Therefore the control word is encrypted with the group key. For the purpose
of this thesis, it is assumed that the actual data to be encrypted by a conditional
access system is a continuous series of control words.
3.3 Group Rekeying
The group key needs to be changed every time a new subscriber is added (to prevent
them being able to decrypt any transmissions made prior to their joining) or an old
subscriber is removed (to prevent them being able to decrypt any future transmis-
sions). This process is referred to as rekeying. In a network with a large number of
users, and frequent join and remove operations taking place, the overhead in terms
of bandwidth and server load for these key distributions can be significant if the
simple protocol described above is used.
For example, assume a network has 10 million users and the size of a rekey message is
54 bytes (see Section 4.7 for the format of a suitable rekey message). Then for every
join or leave operation the server needs to perform 10 million encryption operations,
and needs to transmit approximately 515 MB of incompressible data. If the data
is broadcast or multicast, then every client needs to receive all the data to find the
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one key message applicable to them. If the data is unicast then the load on a client
is negligible, however the server needs to make 10 million outgoing connections —
which places high demands on a system that can multicast all other data (video and
audio).
This section discusses a number of alternative methods for performing these group
rekey operations. The methods are compared and assessed with regards to their
applicability to a conditional access system. The comparison is given in Section 3.3.7.
3.3.1 Stateful and Stateless
Zhu and Jajodia [48] classify methods for group rekey operations as either stateful
or stateless. This state refers to the information a client needs to hold in order to
receive and interpret a new key update message.
In a stateful system, a client needs to have successfully interpreted key update
messages that were previously distributed and must hold the keys contained in them
in order for it to be able to decrypt new update messages. As an example, consider
the situation in which each new group key is encrypted by the previous group key.
If a client misses any single key update, it will not be able to interpret subsequent
updates.
In a stateless system, a client does not need to have received previous key updates
and can immediately interpret any new key update message. A trivial example is a
system in which all clients share a symmetric master key. That key never changes
and is used to encrypt and decrypt group key update messages.
A stateful system requires a reliable key distribution mechanism so that clients
receive all key updates. It is therefore best suited to applications which are are able
to maintain semi-permanent network connections, for example. Stateless systems
are useful for applications in which no such connection is available and clients will
not be able to receive all update messages. Distribution of encrypted content on
DVDs is an example of a system where statelessness might be required.
3.3.2 Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
In order to reduce load on the server and the network infrastructure, the users can
be equally divided into two subgroups. Each subgroup contains half the users and
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is associated with an intermediate key-encryption-key known to its members. This
intermediate key can be used to encrypt the group key, and is itself encrypted with
each of the users’ private encryption keys. When a group rekey operation takes place,
only half of the users need to receive a new intermediate key — those belonging to
the subgroup to which the new member is added (or from which an existing member
is removed, respectively). Those users also receive a new group key encrypted with
their new intermediate key. The other half of the users only need to receive the
new group key encrypted with their existing intermediate key. Thus the required
bandwidth and number of encryption operations is nearly halved.
This approach can be extended by halving each subgroup again and adding a new
layer of intermediate keys. In that case approximately only a quarter of the original
bandwidth and encryption operations is required.
If this process is repeated at each layer until each subgroup has only two users, the
number of keys involved in a rekey operation is equal to the number of layers of
intermediate keys between the affected user and the group key. This tree structure
is known as Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [43]. If the tree is full and balanced, the
complexity of a rekey operation is O(logN).
In fact it is not necessary that the tree tree structure be binary as described above.
It can have any degree. Wong et al. [45] experimentally determined that the optimal
degree is 4 with respect to number of key update messages and processing time.
Assume that Figure 3.3a repre ents some initial state of an LKH tree containing 8
members, U1 . . . U8. Each member Ui holds a key Ki known only to that member
and the key server. GK is the group key shared by all members. K123 is known
only to the members of the subtree containing users U1, U2 and U3. Likewise, the
key K456 is known to U4, U5 and U6, and K78 to U7 and U8.
Given this tree structure, the following procedures are followed to update keys when
a new member joins or an existing member has its access revoked.
LKH Join Operation
To add a new member, U9, the key server locates
2 an intermediate node in the tree
that is not full and attaches a new child node there containing K9. In Figure 3.3a
K78 is this joining point. The key at that node and the group key GK need to be
2Methods for locating this node are not specified by the literature and are left to a particular
implementation to determine.
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U6 U8
K2
U4U1 U5
GK
K456
U3U2
K3
K123
K1 K7K6K5K4
K78
K8
U7
(a) Initial
U9U8U5U4 U7U6U1 U3U2
K789
GK ′
K3K2K1 K7K6K5K4 K9K8
K456K123
(b) Join
U9U8U5U4 U7U6U1 U3U2
K789
GK ′′
K3K2K1 K7K6K5K4 K9K8
K46K123
(c) Leave
Figure 3.3: Logical Key Hierarchy
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updated. The key server generates new random keys K789 and GK
′ to replace them,
respectively. These are shown marked with double circles in Figure 3.3b. These new
keys then need to be securely delivered to U9 and to the existing members that need
them. Note that initially U9 only holds its secret key K9.
Wong et al. [45] distinguish between three mechanisms for distributing these keys to
users. These differ in how to determine the grouping of new keys and which existing
keys to use to encrypt the update messages. The selection of existing keys used to
encrypt new keys needs to be done in such a way as to avoid revealing new keys to
users who should not hold them.
With user-oriented rekeying, the server creates a message containing exactly the
keys needed by a particular user and encrypts it with a key held by that user (and
other users with the same requirements). Figure 3.4 shows the key messages that
would be sent to update the group key for the example given above of U9 joining.
s→ U9 : 〈K789, GK ′〉K9
s→ U7, U8 : 〈K789, GK ′〉K78
s→ U1, · · · , U6 : 〈GK ′〉GK
Figure 3.4: User-oriented rekeying strategy when member U9 joins
With key-oriented rekeying, each new key is encrypted separately, perhaps multiple
times with different existing keys. Figure 3.5 shows the key messages that would be
sent to perform the same group rekeying as above with the key-oriented strategy.
s→ U9 : 〈GK ′〉K9
s→ U9 : 〈K789〉K9
s→ U7, U8 : 〈K789〉K78
s→ U1, · · · , U8 : 〈GK ′〉GK
Figure 3.5: Key-oriented rekeying strategy when member U9 joins
In practice, implementing user or key oriented rekeying involves establishing mul-
tiple unicast connections or having multiple multicast subgroups. Group-oriented
rekeying is the most straightforward to implement and results in the fewest rekey
messages.
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Group-oriented rekeying creates a single message containing all new keys encrypted
as necessary. Members U7 and U8 need K789. All the users need GK
′. Since U7
and U8 already hold the previous key K78 and U9 does not, K78 can be used to
encrypt K789. Likewise all existing members hold GK which can be used to encrypt
its replacement GK ′. These update messages are shown in Figure 3.6.
s→ U1, U2, · · · , U8 : 〈GK ′〉GK , 〈K789〉K78 (multicast)
s→ U9 : 〈K789, GK ′〉K9 (unicast)
Figure 3.6: Group-oriented rekeying strategy when member U9 joins
LKH Leave Operation
In Figure 3.3c, member U5 is removed. Key K456 needs to be replaced with a new
key K46 and GK
′ is replaced with GK ′′. However since U5 holds both of these
existing keys (K456 and GK
′), they cannot be used to encrypt their replacements.
GK ′′ is therefore encrypted separately with K123 and K789. K46 is encrypted with
K4 and K6. Finally, GK
′′ is encrypted with the new K46 which members U4 and
U6 will obtain after decrypting the previous message. These update messages are
shown in Figure 3.7.
s→ U1, U2, · · · , U9 : 〈GK ′′〉K123 , 〈GK ′′〉K789 , 〈K46〉K4 , 〈K46〉K6 , 〈GK ′′〉K46
Figure 3.7: Group-oriented rekeying strategy for member U5 leaving
LKH+
Perlman [32] suggests an improvement to LKH which he calls “LKH+”. In the
case of a join operation, existing members apply a one-way hash function to the
updated keys. This means that it is not necessary to transmit the actual key data
when performing such an update. Only a message indicating the key has changed
is required, thus saving significantly on bandwidth.
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3.3.3 One-Way Function Trees (OFT)
McGrew and Sherman [26] propose a technique based on one-way functions applied
bottom-up in a key tree. The key server maintains a binary tree. Unlike LKH,
interior nodes of the tree are computed based on their children. Associated with
each node i of the tree are two keys: the node key Ki and the blinded key Kbi.
Kbi = f(Ki) where f(x) is a one-way function. Kbi is blinded in the sense that
it cannot be used to determine Ki due to the one-wayness of f (without incurring
great computational expense). The use of blinded keys allows a particular member
to calculate the intermediate keys on its path to the root without being able to
determine the node keys of its siblings.
Each leaf node is associated with a group member and the node key Ki of a leaf
node is known only to that member and the key server. The node key Kj of an
interior node is derived from the blinded keys of its left and right children: Kj =
f(KL)⊕ f(KR), where ⊕ represents a mixing function such as bitwise exclusive-or
(XOR).
Each member knows only its own node key and the blinded keys of the sibling nodes
on the path from its leaf node to the root. It can use these to derive the node
keys on its path to the root. The node key of the root node is the group key. See
Figure 3.8 for an example of how keys are derived within the tree. OFT requires
less bandwidth for key update messages than an equivalent binary LKH tree. This
is because updating any key only requires distribution of its blinded key to the half
of the members rooted at either the key’s left or right child node.
OFT Join Operation
When a new member joins the group, an existing leaf node is split into two. The
existing member is placed as the left child and the new member becomes the right
child. For example in Figure 3.9a member U5 has joined the group originally shown in
Figure 3.8. Some existing leaf node is chosen, in this case the one that was associated
with U3. U3 now becomes the left child and receives a new key K
′
3. Likewise the
right child for the new member becomes a new key, K5. Then the original K3 is
replaced with K35 = f(K
′
3) ⊕ f(K5), K34 with K345 = f(K35) ⊕ f(K4), and K1−4
with K1−5 = f(K12)⊕ f(K345).
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K1−4 = f(K12)⊕ f(K34)
K34 K34 = f(K3)⊕ f(K4)K12
U4
K12 = f(K1)⊕ f(K2)
U1 U3U2
K3
K1−4
K1 K4K2
Figure 3.8: One-Way Function Tree: In this example, member U3 holds node
key K3 and blinded keys Kb4 = f(K4) and Kb12 = f(K12). It can thus derive
K34 = f(K3)⊕Kb4 and K1−4 = f(K34)⊕Kb12. K1−4 is the root key.
In general, if the key Kx for node x is updated, its blinded key needs to be distributed
to the members in the subtree rooted at its sibling node s. These members already
hold the node key Ks which can be used for encryption.
Therefore Kb35 = f(K35) will be encrypted with K4 and Kb345 = f(K345) with K12.
K ′3 can be encrypted with K3 as only the security of its blinded key is compromised
for further use. It is assumed that K5 and other blinded keys required by U5 are
transmitted as part of some separate secure communication. The updated keys
would be distributed as follows (Ks5 is some arbitrary key known only to the server
and member U5):
s→ U5 : 〈K5, Kb′3, Kb4, Kb12〉Ks5 (unicast)
s→ U1, · · · , U4 : 〈K ′3〉K3 , 〈Kb35〉K4 , 〈Kb345〉K12
OFT Leave Operation
When a member leaves, the update process is similar. It is necessary to differentiate
between two cases. In the first case, the sibling of the leaf node associated with
the removed node is also a leaf node. In this case, the member associated with the
sibling is reassigned to the parent node and given a new key. For example, Figure
3.9b shows U1 being removed from the group shown in Figure 3.9a. The nodes K1
and K2 are removed, and U2 is reassigned to its original parent node, and given a
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K1−5 = f(K12)⊕ f(K345)
K345
K35 = f(K
′
3)⊕ f(K5)
K345 = f(K35)⊕ f(K4)
K2
U5
U4U1
U3
U2
K35
K1−5
K1
K5K
′
3
K4
K12
(a) Join
K345K
′
2
U5
U4U1
U3
U2
K35
K2−5
K1
K5K
′
3
K4
(b) U1 leaves
K ′2
U5 U4U3U2
K ′35
K235
K5K
′′
3 K4
(c) U4 leaves
Figure 3.9: OFT: Member join and leave operations. In (a) U5 joins. Then U1
is removed in (b) and finally U4 removed in (c). Nodes marked with double circles
have changed. Their respective blinded keys need to be distributed to the subtrees
rooted at their siblings.
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new key K ′2. The key update message is multicast as follows:
s→ U2, · · · , U5 : 〈K ′2〉K2 , 〈Kb′2〉K345
In the second case, the sibling is an intermediate node — the root of a subtree. The
parent node is then replaced by the sibling and one of the leaf nodes in the subtree
needs to be changed so the node key (and therefore the blinded key that was known
to the removed member) is updated. Figure 3.9c illustrates this by removing U4
from the group. K ′3 is the leaf node in the sibling subtree that is arbitrarily selected
to be changed (in order to change the blinded key of K35 that was know to U4). The
update message would be as follows:
s→ U2, U3, U5 : 〈K ′′3 〉K′3 , 〈Kb′′3〉K5 , 〈Kb′35〉K′2
3.3.4 Subset-Difference Rekeying (SDR)
Subset-Difference Rekeying is a stateless protocol for group rekeying proposed by
Naor et al. [29]. A stateless protocol is attractive because it allows for members to
obtain the current group key even after having missed previous key updates due to
being oﬄine for a period of time. It works on the basis of users possessing information
about other users in such a way that when a user is removed, the remaining users
can recalculate the group key without the removed user being able to.
The key server maintains a binary tree, and as with the other techniques, the leaf
nodes represent subscribers. Consider the two subtrees rooted at the internal nodes,
or vertices, Vx and Vy, where Vy is a descendant node of Vx. Sx and Sy are sets of
users (leaf nodes) in each of these subtrees respectively and Sy ⊂ Sx. Then Sxy is the
subset of users contained in Sx but not Sy, that is Sxy = Sx \Sy. A key is associated
with each subset such that if a subset describes a selection of members, less the
revoked members, it can be used to encrypt the new group key for distribution to
valid members. This is illustrated in Figure 3.10.
The challenge is to partition the valid members into a minimal number of subsets and
encrypt the group key with each associated key. Clearly a member will be included
in many possible subsets and it is necessary to determine a way to minimize the
number of keys that the member must store.
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U9 . . . U16U8U5U4 U7U6U1 U3U2
Vc
Vf
Vd
Vb . . .
Ve
Va
Figure 3.10: Subset-Difference Rekeying. Part of a tree containing 16 group mem-
bers. Assume members U2, U5 and U6 have been revoked (shown as filled nodes).
The remaining members can be represented by the subsets Sab = {U9, · · · , U16},
Sde = {U7, U8} and Scf = {U1, U3, U4}.
This method hinges on it perpetually retaining information about removed members.
That is, the nodes associated with revoked users must remain in the tree. Thus over
time as the number of revoked users grows, so will the number of subsets, and the
number of separate encryptions of the group key that must take place. The server
memory usage also increases with time. For a pay-TV system, it must be assumed
that members will be removed frequently as they change or cancel subscriptions.
Therefore the performance of the SDR technique can be expected to degrade over
time.
3.3.5 MARKS
Multicast Key Management using Arbitrarily Revealed Key Sequences (MARKS) [6]
takes a different approach. A binary tree is used, but the nodes are not associated
with group members. Instead membership duration is divided into fixed time periods
and a group key is associated with each period. The key server maintains a binary
hash tree where the key associated with each node is derived from the key in its
parent node by application of a one-way hash function. Two distinct functions f and
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f g
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 . . .
K
K1,2
K2,4K2,2
K1,1
K2,1 K2,3
K3,8K3,5K3,4 K3,7K3,6K3,1 K3,3K3,2
Figure 3.11: MARKS: The children nodes at each level are derived from their
parent node by applying one-way functions f and g.
g are used to derive the left and right child keys respectively. Leaf-nodes represent
the group key to be used for some fixed time period. Once the time period has
passed, the next successive leaf node’s key is used. Members have knowledge of f
and g and by providing a member with the keys of intermediate nodes he is able to
derive the larger set of keys associated with his time period.
An example is shown in Figure 3.11. For a pay-per-view application we might
assume the time periods shown, Ti, represent hours. A particular subscriber might
request time periods T3, T4, and T6. The server can then supply him with keys K2,2
and K3,6. He can derive group keys K3,3 and K3,4 from K2,2 by applying f and g
respectively. K3,6 is already a leaf node key. In this way, the user is provided with
exactly the keys required for his allocated subscription period. The number of keys
actually transmitted is smaller than the number of keys actually required by the
user.
3.3.6 F-PPC Key Refreshment Scheme
Sun et al. [41] propose the Flexible Pay-per-Channel (F-PPC) model which incor-
porates both a group rekey operation and a method for more efficiently handling
the problem of multiple services (“channels”). The latter is described further in
Section 3.4.2.
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They claim superior performance for their binary-tree based group rekey operation
over other methods. Their method relies on each subscriber not possessing some
secret associated with itself that is possessed by every other subscriber. While
similar to SDR, this method does not have the benefit of statelessness. To varying
extents all the other rekeying methods discussed in section 3.3 depend on subscribers
having access to only a very limited subset of information that is possessed by others
(in the form of intermediate tree nodes).
However in F-PPC the secret associated with a subscriber has permanence. Once
created, there is no method to update it for the duration of the subscription. Also,
knowledge of the secret is held by all other subscribers. This makes the system
particularly vulnerable to collusion between any two or more subscribers in a way
that would be difficult to stop without regenerating the entire tree. Our presentation
of an example attack follows.
Basic collusion attack on F-PPC rekey operation
Say an attacker purchases two independent subscriptions, A and B for the purposes
of this example, with full access to all services. If the attacker can somehow retrieve
from B the secret associated with A, he can then unsubscribe both A and B and still
be able to obtain the new group key that is generated after removal of A from the
system, and can continue to do so in perpetuity as he now has complete information
about the system. Even if this is discovered by the operator, there is no way to stop
the unauthorised access to content without regenerating the entire F-PPC tree.
Even so, it would not be burdensome for the attacker to repeat the process.
The security of this technique therefore hinges entirely on the security of subscriber
local storage (ie. the smartcard or other encrypted storage). Furthermore, the
technique is stateful and therefore provides minimal benefit over LKH and OFT.
The single point of failure and the scale of potential compromise makes this method
unsuitable for our purposes.
3.3.7 Comparison of Rekey Techniques
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the aforementioned group rekey mechanisms. The
benefits and drawbacks associated with each technique are compared with consid-
eration for the requirements of a conditional access system.
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Technique Benefits Drawbacks
LKH: Logical Key Hierarchy Efficient O(logdn) per-
formance for key up-
dates with n users and
a tree of degree d.
Stateful. If users miss
updates due to packet
loss or being oﬄine for
a period of time, they
need a fallback mecha-
nism to receive keys.
LKH+: Logical Key Hierarchy+ Reduces bandwidth for
key updates on a join
operation over LKH.
Improvement does not
apply to member leave
operations.
OFT: One-Way Function Trees No need to transmit ac-
tual key data (although
blinded keys must be
distributed).
Stateful (as above). Re-
stricted to binary trees.
SDR: Subset-Difference Rekeying Stateless technique. Performance degrades
as the size of the set
of revoked users in-
creases. Higher key
storage requirements
for members.
MARKS: Multicast Key Manage-
ment using Arbitrarily Revealed
Key Sequences
Stateless technique that
allows providing users
with keys for a pre-
defined time period up-
front.
No ability to revoke
users who have already
received keys.
F-PPC: Flexible Pay-Per Channel Provides an efficient
means for supporting
multiple services.
Key refreshment
scheme is vulnerable to
collusion between users.
Table 3.1: Comparison of group rekey techniques
38
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
SK1
GX
U1, · · · , Un
SK2
GY
U1, · · · , Un
SK3
GZ
U1, · · · , Un
Figure 3.12: Na¨ıve approach to supporting multiple services. A separate group
key SKi is used for each service. In the worst case, each rekey tree Gj contains all
n subscribers.
3.4 Multiple Service Architecture
Thus far we have only considered the case of a single group key being shared amongst
the subscribers. Typically, pay-TV operators provide multiple content services and
offer a selection of subscription choices to their customers.
Whilst a single key could be used to encrypt all services, this would only differ-
entiate between subscribers and non-subscribers. Thus any valid subscriber would
technically be able to decrypt the content streams for every service. Any finer
grained subscription choices would have to be enforced by the set-top-box/client
software (for example, by suppressing channels which are not in the subscriber’s
entitlements).
Clearly this is not a cryptographically-secure approach, and is essentially “security-
by-obscurity”. The question arises of how to implement finer grained access controls
that strictly restrict a subscriber to his/her subscription choice.
The technical limitations of any such technique should be carefully considered so as
not to impose undue restrictions on the business model and service offerings of the
operator.
3.4.1 Na¨ıve Approach
The most obvious solution to the problem of securely supporting multiple services
is to use a separate key tree for each service. Thus each service has a separate group
key. An example with 3 services is shown in Figure 3.12.
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This naive approach will be inefficient both in terms of memory and bandwidth
usage. In the worst case, a system with n subscribers and m services would require
memory on the order of O(n×m). Furthermore, any join and leave of a subscriber
would require a rekey operation for every tree in the system, thus resulting in a
potentially large number of rekey messages needing to be transmitted to subscribers.
In the case of subscription choices being divided into service groupings (known as
“bouquets”), a single group key could be used for all services in that grouping. This
would reduce the total number of key trees and also the number of trees that any
arbitrary subscriber is a member of. If only a handful of groupings are offered, the
efficiency of the system might be acceptable even in the case of a large number
of subscribers and services. However this poses a specific restriction on the busi-
ness model of an operator and the flexibility of its offerings. The scalability and
complexity of this approach is the same as for using a separate key for each service.
3.4.2 Flexible Pay-per-Channel
The multiple service architecture suggested by F-PPC allows a subscriber to make
a completely arbitrary selection of services. Subscribers are placed into groups
along with other subscribers which the same selection of services. A subscriber is
in exactly one such subscription group. Associated with each subscription group Gx
is a Group Authorisation Key (GAK), GKx. Associated with each service Si is a
group, the members of which have access to a Service Authorisation Key (SAK),
SKi. The subscription groups themselves are members of the service authorisation
groups. Therefore a member of a particular subscription group uses his GAK to
decrypt the SAK for each service his subscription group is authorised for. The
group rekey mechanism used for distributing these GAKs and SAKs is separate
from this hierarchy structure for associating groups.
Allowing completely arbitrary selections of services is a feature demanded by cus-
tomers of pay-TV operators [42]. Aside from business model considerations, techni-
cal reasons limit the ease with which such a feature can be implemented.
With completely arbitrary selection of services, for each service a subscriber either
does or not does subscribe to it. Therefore the number of possible combinations
of m services, excluding the empty set, is 2m − 1. For example, if 3 services are
available 23 − 1 = 7 groupings of subscribers are possible. See Table 3.2 for an
example of possible subscription selections of 3 services, {S1, · · · , S3}, by 6 users,
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{U1, · · · , U6}. Their particular choices have resulted in 4 groupings {GW , · · · , GZ}.
The service trees and user group trees associated with these subscriptions are shown
in Figure 3.13.
However with realistic numbers of services, the number of possible groupings rapidly
becomes unrealistic for implementation purposes. For example, 100 services would
allow a maximum of 2100 − 1 possible groupings.
With F-PPC, the numbers of groupings is bounded by the number of subscribers,
n. Practically n  2m − 1, and in the worst case, each subscriber has a unique
service selection. Therefore the number of groupings is given by max(2m − 1, n).
Nevertheless, an implementation of this mechanism without additional restrictions
in place can easily become impractical.
3.5 Reliable Key Delivery
IP packet routing is inherently unreliable: the source transmits packets blindly with-
out any knowledge of whether they arrive successfully at their destination(s). The
concept of a “connection” is introduced by a protocol such as TCP, which facilitates
a reliable one-to-one connection between two endpoints. TCP is therefore not appli-
cable to multicast or broadcast transmissions. The simpler, “connectionless”, UDP
is used for these one-to-many transmissions. UDP provides no guarantees that a
datagram will be received at its destination, and if it is received, there is no guaran-
tee of correctness or that multiple packets are received in the order they were sent.
The possibility of a multicast packet not being correctly received by all interested
participants needs to be considered. If a member misses a key update, especially
with a stateful rekeying algorithm, he will not be able to decrypt the transmission
or further key updates.
In a DVB network with no return-path, certain data that needs to be readily avail-
able is repeatedly transmitted in a loop, sometimes know as a carousel. In compar-
ison, on an IP network, a client who has missed out on some keys can fallback to a
unicast request for those keys. Obviously it is necessary to minimize the number of
such requests, otherwise the performance of the system can degrade to that where
all keys are supplied individually to subscribers with unicast, which is a situation
these mechanisms are trying to avoid.
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U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6
S1 • • •
S2 • • • •
S3 • • • • •
GX GY GX GW GZ GW
Table 3.2: Example subscriptions for users U1, · · · , U6. Users are grouped into
exactly one of GW , · · · , GZ along with other users who have matching subscriptions.
SK1
S1
GX , GY
SK2
S2
GW , GY , GZ
SK3
S3
GW , GX , GY
GX
U1, U3
GY
U2
GZ
U5
GW
U4, U6
GKW GKX GKY GKZ
Figure 3.13: F-PPC Approach to supporting multiple services. Each user is a
member of exactly one user group Gj according to his subscription preferences and
receives a Group Authentication Key, GKj. The user group is in turn a member of
one or more subscription groups S1, · · · , S3. Members of subscription group Sk will
have Service Authentication Key Sk for each service their group is authorised for.
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DVB Satellite, Cable, and Terrestrial networks make use of two levels of error cor-
rection [14]. Firstly, 16 bytes of optional Reed-Solomon error correction information
can be added to the 188 byte MPEG transport stream (TS) packets, resulting in
a packet size of 204 bytes. This provides error correction at the transport stream
packet level and would remain in recorded streams, for example. Secondly, internal
to the DVB transmitter a convolutional code is used with various code rates (com-
monly 1/2, 3/4, 5/6, 7/8). The convolutional code provides the ability to tune the error
correction according to available bandwidth and network quality. This is commonly
termed “FEC” (Forward Error Correction) in STB configuration menus. An FEC
rate of 1/2 would mean 50% of the transmitted data represents error correction in-
formation, whereas an FEC rate of 7/8 means that only 12.5% of transmitted data
is for error correction.
Various solutions have been proposed to the problem of reliable multicast network-
ing. Examples are Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM) [39] and Scalable Reliable
Multicast (SRM) [18]. These protocols either replace UDP or implement an ad-
ditional layer above UDP, but they are complex [48], and often require extensive
support from network equipment.
Application level solutions specifically consider the problem of reliable key distri-
bution. These are primarily Weighted Key Assignment with Batched Key Retrans-
mission (WKA-BKR) [38], and Proactive FEC-based Key Delivery [46] which uses
Reed-Solomon erasure correction codes. Zhu et al. have proposed a hybrid method,
WFEC-BKR in an extension to SDR that incorporates “self-healing” [49].
WKA-BKR improves significantly on the bandwidth usage of the multi-send ap-
proach wherein each key update message would be sent multiple times. A weight
is assigned to each key based on the number of users that hold the key. Keys held
by more users are weighted higher and are retransmitted more times than keys with
lower weights.
3.6 Batched Updates
Depending on the application, it is not always necessary to immediately perform a
group rekey on a member joining or leaving. This is especially the case with pay-TV.
If, for example, the content is offered on a subscription basis it is only necessary
to perform a group rekey operation at the end of the subscription period (say, at
month end). In that case, multiple members might be revoked at the same time
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and depending on the rekeying strategy being used some benefit can be gained in
combining the operations. Batching key updates in this way is addressed by Setia et
al. [37] and Yang et al. [46] who demonstrate reduced bandwidth usage and number
of key updates.
Apart from reasons of subscription periods, and depending on the business require-
ments of a particular operator, the revocation of a member can be delayed until some
other batch rekey frequency. The member will then be able to access content for
slightly longer than their subscription period but this should not have any negative
impact on the security of the system or finances of the operator if the time period
between batch operations is controlled.
3.7 Secure Key Storage
A critical aspect of the security of a cryptographic system is the security of the
keys themselves. The discussion thus far has considered mechanisms for securely
transmitting keys over a network so that only appropriately authorised users will
receive them. However once the keys are in the possession of the user, steps need to
be taken to prevent their unauthorised disclosure via other channels.
The standard method of protecting keys is in a tamper-resistant device such as a
smartcard. The smartcard is able to perform cryptographic operations and often
the majority of client-side key handling operations are performed within it.
However smartcards incur additional costs and have limitations. Special hardware
is required in a set-top-box to interface with them, and this restricts the deploy-
ment of a CA system that depends on them to devices with applicable hardware
(therefore eliminating devices such as smart-phones and tablets). Royalties are often
payable, and smartcards are limited in their processing power and storage capacities
potentially restricting the type and frequency of cryptographic operations they can
perform.
Therefore in situations where minimizing cost is a factor, or where various types of
devices need to be able to receive content, a system that is secure without the need
for a smartcard is necessary.
Contemporary STB hardware typically makes use of a secure boot mechanism [3].
Usually some area of the silicon in the device’s system-on-a-chip (SoC) and/or its
flash memory chips is able to check a cryptographic signature of the software that
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will be loaded into memory. This ensures that no unauthorised (unsigned) software
is able to run on the device. Together with encryption of the applicable areas of
non-volatile storage (flash, or hard disk), and encryption of random access memory
(RAM encryption is prevalent in STB devices), reasonable assurance can be had
that an attacker will not be able to access keys stored on a STB.
This assurance is often not sufficient, however. Development of a set-top-box plat-
form might involve multiple parties – hardware manufacturer (who also develops
driver software), user interface software developers, conditional access vendor, pay-
TV operator, and increasingly on modern set-top-boxes and media devices, third-
party application (“app”) developers. This provides multiple avenues for software
that will be signed and legitimately running on the device that could potentially
gain access to keys via some exploit.
Payne [31] proposes VAULTS, “a cryptographic access control architecture secure
against privileged attackers”. He describes a complete access control framework
targeted at a multi-user, Unix-like, general purpose operating system. Data stored
in this framework is secure even against a user with root access or physical access
to the storage medium (such as hard disks). This is distinct from the usual access
control scheme that uses active protection enforced by the kernel. Even in a system
with full-disk-encryption (FDE), legitimate users might be able to elevate their
privileges thus allowing unauthorised access to data belonging to other users.
VAULTS depends on the system having some form of trusted-computing or secure
boot module and provides a combination of access control and a cryptographic file
system. The secure bootstrap process ensures that the kernel is trusted (the process
of assessing/auditing the security of the kernel prior to signing is not considered).
Briefly, each user has a secure repository known as a “vault” – an encrypted area
used to store keys, fingerprints (hashes) of system programs, and “tickets” used
to access cryptographically protected files. These are decrypted at login and their
contents are only accessible by cryptographically verified processes. The secure
kernel prevents access to vaults when they are stored in memory. Apart from user
vaults, various system vaults and a public-key infrastructure are defined. The kernel
acts as an intermediary, decrypting files on behalf of users who hold valid tickets.
Users never have direct access to the actual protection keys.
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3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a comprehensive survey of techniques that facil-
itate a key server securely sharing and frequently updating a Group Key amongst
a large, dynamic group of receivers. In Section 3.2 we introduced the concept of a
hierarchy of keys to facilitate scalability of rekeying operations. In Section 3.3 we
reviewed and categorized existing techniques for group rekeying: the stateful “Log-
ical Key Hierarchy” (LKH), LKH+, and One-way Function Trees (OFT), and the
stateless Subset-Difference Rekeying (SDR) and Multicast Key Management using
Arbitrarily Revealed Key Sequences (MARKS).
In Section 3.4, we considered techniques for expanding the group rekeying techniques
to a pay-television system that cryptographically separates users with different sub-
scription selections. In Section 3.5, methods for addressing missed or corrupted key
updates were outlined. In Section 3.6, batched keys updates are introduced as a
trade-off that sacrifices the security of immediate rekey operations for a reduction
in the number of key updates that need to be performed. Finally, in Section 3.7, we
discussed approaches to securing the persistent storage of keys by the receiver.
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Chapter 4
Proposed CA System
4.1 Overview of Proposed System
In order to answer the research questions posed in Section 1.3, a framework for a
conditional access system has been designed. An implementation of the key man-
agement and distribution scheme is used to experimentally assess its viability.
The flexibility and efficiency of this system is facilitated by the hierarchy of keys
described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 and the particular groupings of services and users
that are detailed in Section 4.4.
Each of the groupings of services and users is based on the LKH+ key-tree scheme
that incorporates a one-way hash function for reducing the size of join messages.
Two alternative methods are presented for “growing” a full LKH tree. The preferred
method that is proposed reduces the number of messages that need to be sent when
growing the tree and performing key updates for joining subscribers.
The question of supporting multiple devices (multi-room viewing scenarios) on a
single subscription can be addressed with an extension to the proposed key hierarchy.
This is given in Section 4.4.3. A protocol for initially establishing a secret key shared
between the key server and a receiver device is given in Section 4.5.
Specific details of key server operations (Section 4.6) and the format of rekey mes-
sages (Section 4.7), along with client processing of updates (Section 4.8), and a client
fallback protocol for handling missed updates (Section 4.9) are also presented.
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SAK1
...
SAKn
UPKGAK UK
CWn
CW1
Figure 4.1: Key Hierarchy
The solution optionally incorporates batched key updates for reducing bandwidth
and the total number of key processing operations. The method for achieving these
batched updates is described in Section 4.10.
Suggestions are given for exploiting the properties of multicast packet routing.
Greater efficiency in network utilisation can be achieved by assig ing each of the
aforementioned groupings of subscribers and services to separate multicast groups.
Security can be improved with network support by adding access control to multicast
groups. This prevents illegitimate users “piggy-backing” off the network.
Finally, to address the question of secure storage of keys without the need for a
smartcard, a structure of “application vaults” is presented in Section 4.12 that relies
on a trusted platform.
4.2 Key Hierarchy
A symmetric User Private Key (UPK) is shared between a subscriber and the server
and known only to these two parties. The mechanism by which such a key can be
shared can vary. For example, it can be a pre-shared key inserted into a set-top-
box’s non-volatile memory at the time of manufacture, or a public key negotiation
protocol might be used to establish it (see Section 4.5 for details of such a proto-
col). This symmetric key would typically remain unchanged for the duration of the
subscription. It is used to share a User Key (UK) associated with the leaf-node of
a LKH tree that is also known only to the server and the subscriber. The UPK
allows for updating the UK when necessary (eg. if a user changes his subscription
selection) and for sharing additional session keys (eg. for unicast communications
such as video-on-demand).
The user key is used to decrypt a Group Authentication Key (GAK), a group key
shared amongst users with the same viewing preferences (ie. matching subscription
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selections). A user is placed into exactly one such group. This means the total
overhead of this multiple group system is minimal compared to placing all users in a
single group. The GAK is then used to decrypt another group key, the Service Au-
thentication Key (SAK). This supports multiple independently encrypted services:
groups of users are authenticated for specific services.
To maintain compatibility with DVB descrambling equipment and to fit into the
DVB-CA framework, the actual data stream that is encrypted by our system is the
sequence of control words (CWs) used to scramble the video. These control words
are updated frequently (as often as every few seconds). The SAK is used to decrypt
the control words of the service associated with it. The encrypted CW is transmitted
along with the encrypted video content in ECMs. It can be updated as often as the
operator likes, without needing the more expensive group rekey operations to be
performed so frequently. Further, the distribution of these CWs is stateless — if
any particular CW is missed by a receiver, it will be able to start decrypting as
soon as it receives the next CW (typically within a few seconds), thus resulting in
minimal disruption.
The presented structure consisting of the User Key, Group Authentication Key,
Service Authentication Key, and Control Word represents a 4-level key hierarchy.
The keys associated with a particular user are illustrated in Figure 4.1. A key
refreshment scheme is associated with each of these keys. The control words and
user keys are shared and updated as described above. The GAKs are updated
via key trees associated with each group. Likewise, the SAKs are updated via
key trees associated with each service. The key tree mechanism is described in
Section 4.3. The relationship between GAKs and SAKs is defined by a multiple
service architecture described in Section 4.4.
4.3 Group Key Refreshment
The implementation makes use of the LKH+ algorithm, which in practice is found
to perform better than OFT [6]. This is due to OFT using a binary tree (degree
of 2), whereas LKH is not restricted in this way. Wong et al. [45] found that the
optimal degree for a LKH tree is 4, which reduces the height of the tree significantly
and therefore the number of key update operations that need to be performed for
any join or leave operation.
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U1 U3U2
K3K2K1
GK
(a) Full tree
U4U1 U3U2
K3K2
K1 K4
GK ′
K145
(b) After splitting existing node
Figure 4.2: One approach to inserting a new member, U4, into a full LKH tree.
The literature gives little consideration to the specifics of building and maintaining
the structure of a LKH tree. The O(logdn) performance of a LKH tree assumes
the tree is balanced, however the algorithm does not guarantee this. Haroon [19]
proposes a mechanism for balancing a binary LKH tree based on AVL rotations,
however this does not extend to LKH trees of variable degree.
4.3.1 Splitting Leaf Nodes
Once all leaf nodes in a LKH tree of a particular height are full, some mechanism is
required for “growing” the tree to insert further members. One approach is to split
an existing leaf node by moving it down one level and inserting a new intermediate
node as its parent. See Figure 4.2 for an example. The node containing K1 is split
and a new key K145 is placed there. K1 is moved to the left child node, and the
new user’s key K4 is inserted as the first sibling. The key update message would be
transmitted as follows:
s→ U4 : 〈GK ′, K145〉K4 (unicast)
s→ U1, · · · , U3 : 〈K145〉K1 , 〈GK ′〉GK
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The number of keys to be updated by this method for inserting a new member
into an already full tree by this method is O(logdn), assuming the tree is balanced
initially.
4.3.2 Subtree Insertion Approach
The novelty in the method used in this implementation is to generate a new root
node and insert the existing tree as a subtree rooted as the first child of the new
root. All existing members thus only have to receive a single key update as follows:
s→ U4 : 〈GK ′, K456〉K4 (unicast)
s→ U1, · · · , U3 : 〈GK ′〉GK
This approach offers O(1) performance in terms of multicast key updates and keys
to be processed by users and maintains a balanced tree structure. The height of the
tree is maintained by inserting h intermediate nodes. The height of the new tree
is thus h + 1 as expected and capacity is d-times larger than it was prior to the
grow operation. Note that the implementation only allocates memory for the nodes
as it is required. Thus in Figure 4.3 memory for only 7 key nodes is allocated, as
indicated by the non-empty, circular nodes.
Nodes associated with members who have left are marked as unused. On subsequent
joins, these unused nodes will be re-purposed before another grow operation takes
place. For the pay-TV application, the assumption is made that over time the client
base will always grow, and the tree is designed to perform efficiently under this
condition.
4.4 Subscriber and Service Groupings
To support multiple services, subscribers are separated into groups using a method
similar to F-PPC. The problem with that technique is discussed in Section 3.4.2.
Completely flexible service selection can in the worst case degrade to the situation
where each subscriber has a unique selection. The performance of a key update will
be O(n) in that any change in membership will result in at least n update messages
being transmitted. Memory consumption on the server is of order O(2m) for m
services, which is infeasible for realistic numbers of services.
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U4U1 U3U2
K3K2K1 K4
GK ′
K456GK
Figure 4.3: Subtree Insertion Approach. Inserting a new member, U4, into a full
LKH tree.
The solution proposed here to address these problems is to use bouquets. These are
operator-defined groupings of services defined by DVB, usually used for convenience
in package selection and STB operation. These grou ings can be used to significantly
reduce the number of groups of users by regarding the bouquets as atomic units of
subscription that contain one or more services. Bouquets may overlap — that is,
multiple bouquets might contain the same service — which prevents sharing a key
between all services in the same bouquet.
Subscription groups are defined according to the possible combinations of these
bouquets, which are treated as sets of services. As an example, suppose 3 bou-
quets are available as follows: Bmovies = {S1, S2, S3}, Bsport = {S4, S5, S6, S7}, and
Bnews = {S8, S9}. Each of the 7 possible subscription groups is associated with the
union of the respective bouquets. For example, users subscribing to both “Sport”
and “Movies” would be placed into the group authorised for the services contained
in Bsport ∪Bmovies.
4.4.1 Simulating Flexible Service Selection
As an aside, we provide a suggestion for simulating flexible service selection. This
suggestion is compatible with the proposed multiple service architecture. An op-
erator would start by defining a number of service groupings based on popularity.
For example, the most popular services will be in more groupings while the least
popular services will be in fewer groupings. These groupings could be refined over
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GK ′X
G′X3
SK ′1 SK
′
3
GX
UK7UK3
U7 GXU1
UK1 GY 3
GY
GY 1
U3
G′X1 GW3
GY GW
Figure 4.4: Multiple Service Architecture: Example of user U7 joining with sub-
scription {S1, S3}. Keys in nodes marked with a double circle are updated.
time based on subscription history, and will potentially be quite numerous. When
a new subscriber joins with a selection of services S, find a grouping G such that
S ⊆ G. The objective is to minimise the size of set G \S so that the subscriber has
minimal access to services for which he is not paying. Receiver software could be
used to enforce the subscription by disallowing these services.
4.4.2 Example
This description expands on the example subscriptions given in Table 3.2 and Fig-
ure 3.13. S1, · · · , S3 are services and the SKi keys are Service Authentication Keys.
Suppose a new subscriber U7 joins with subscription {S1, S3}. He is therefore allo-
cated to group GX . The k y trees involved are shown in Figure 4.4.
The LKH+ join algorithm is followed as described in Section 3.3.2, so an updated
GKX will be multicast to users. It is also necessary to update the group keys for
each of the services for which GX is a member, thus SK1 and SK3 will be updated.
The leaf node keys associated with GX in each of those trees will be updated, and
any intermediate keys on the path to the root.
Key updates will be delivered as follows:
s→ U7 : 〈GK ′X , G′X1, SK ′1, G′X3, SK ′3〉UK7 (unicast)
s→ U1, · · · , U6 : 〈GK ′X〉GKX , 〈G′X1〉GX1 , 〈SK ′1〉SK1 , 〈G′X3〉GX3 , 〈SK ′3〉SK3
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SAK1
...
UPK
DPK
SAKn
HAK
GAK UK
CWn
CW1 DK
Figure 4.5: Extended Key Hierarchy to support Multi-Device Subscriptions
Note the distinction between member and subscriber/user. The system architecture
uses multiple trees to support multiple services. A member of a tree may be either
a subscriber or a group of subscribers.
4.4.3 Multi-Device Subscriptions
Modern households often have multiple potential viewing devices: televisions in more
than one room, and mobile devices such as tablets and smart-phones, for example.
An operator may wish to enable a single subscription to access content on these
various devices, possibly for an additional fee per device. This should still maintain
the security properties of the system. It must be possible to revoke access for
individual devices.
We propose a further extension to the F-PPC service grouping model to allow this,
by introducing another level in the key hierarchy for multiple device subscriptions.
Devices associated with a particular subscription are grouped together and share
a Household Authorisation Key (HAK). Each device has an associated Device Key
(DK). The HAK is used to decrypt the User Key.
Additional considerations need to be implemented to ensure that devices on a single
subscription are being used within the subscriber’s household (or other authorised
location). Various approaches to this are possible. For example, devices might need
to be able to communicate with each other on a local network. Alternatively, the
ISP could verify the devices are connecting from the same network endpoint.
The expansion of this idea and a possible cryptographic solution to ensuring devices
are in the same household is relegated to future work.
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4.5 Initial Key Establishment
It is assumed that the client and server share a symmetric encryption key, the User
Private Key (UPK). The means of sharing this key are dependant on the particular
application and operator’s requirements. Keys might be preshared or exchanged
through a secure negotiation protocol. These approaches are discussed below.
4.5.1 Preshared Keys
For purpose specific devices such as STBs, the simplest case is that a unique key
is installed on the device in the factory. Alternatively, the system-on-a-chip will
have a unique key associated with its serial number, both of which are known to the
manufacturer and supplied to the operator.
4.5.2 Protocol for Dynamic Key Establishment
Mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets are increasingly popular and preva-
lent. The trend is towards supplying media to these devices. Such media would be
accessible via a third-party application installed on the device.
It is necessary for the server and the application to share a symmetric key. However
the server has no prior knowledge of the device. It needs some way of verifying that
the application is trusted before sharing this key. We assume that a trusted kernel
(or other secure component of the operating system) is running on the device. The
kernel should be able to verify the integrity of applications before executing them,
and acts as a trusted intermediary in the following protocol.
A→ S : CA, CK , NA (1)
S → K :
〈
〈KAS, NA〉KUA , A, CS
〉
KUK
,
〈
H
(〈KAS, NA〉KUA , A, CS)〉
KRS
(2)
K → A : 〈KAS, NA〉KUA (3)
A legend for the protocol entities is provided in Table 4.1. After S receives message 1,
it verifies that KUK (obtained from CK) is signed by a trusted authority. After
message 2 is received by K, it checks the message authentication code, then verifies
that A is signed by S. If so, it passes the payload to A, from which A can obtain
KAS — which is then used as the UPK.
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A Application
K Trusted Kernel
S Key Server
KAS Key to be shared between A and S
KUA, KUK Public keys of A and K respectively
KRS Private key of S
CA, CS, CK Certificates of A, S, and K, including respective public keys (X.509)
NA Nonce generated by A, used to identify this particular interaction
H Cryptographic hash function
Table 4.1: Legend: Dynamic Key Establishment Protocol
The application needs to take necessary precautions to ensure the secure storage of
keys that are provided to it. The trusted kernel should provide encryption services
to applications as discussed further in Section 4.12.
If the local security of the device is circumvented (commonly referred to as “jail-
breaking”) so that an untrusted kernel executes, then the security of the protocol
fails and an unauthorised application could be supplied with keys. A practical imple-
mentation of this protocol would need to take this possibility into account. Further
platform-specific steps might need to be taken to disqualify such devices.
4.6 Key Server Operations
The subscribe, change subscription, and unsubscribe operations are assumed to be
conducted out-of-band. For example a customer might call the pay-TV operator’s
call centre and provide personal information, payment details, and a unique device
identifier such as a serial number.
Therefore at the time the subscriber is added to the tree, the necessary key updates
are made by the server and multicast to the current subscribers. The new subscriber
is not necessarily online at that time. When it comes online it must use the rekey
request protocol to receive the necessary keys.
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4.6.1 Dynamic Subscriptions
In the case of a mobile device, a subscription might be obtained by an “in-app”
purchase mechanism (for example Apple iOS in-app purchases). A separate pro-
tocol can be defined for communicating the selected services along with payment
verification information to the key server.
In this case, the protocol would supply the user with necessary keys immediately
and then trigger the multicast updates.
4.6.2 Subscribe
The server creates a new subscriber entry and associates it with the leaf node of
a particular subscription group tree. The symmetric key in the associated node is
shared with the subscriber, encrypted with the UPK.
This process is shown in Algorithm 1: On line 2 the server attempts to match
the subscription selection of the new user to an existing grouping of users. If no
such group exists, the server creates a new key tree on line 4 and creates a new
association with the subscription selection on line 5. The user is then inserted into
the new grouping (line 6) and the grouping is authorised for each service in the
subscription selection (lines 7 to 9).
If an existing grouping was found, the user is inserted into it (line 11) and each
constituent service of the associated subscription is rekeyed from the node associated
with the grouping (lines 12 to 15).
4.6.3 Change Subscription
When a subscriber’s subscription selection changes, he is moved to the new sub-
scriber group. Keys of services that were in the previous subscription and remain
in the new one are not updated.
Suppose the subscriber’s existing subscription is given by the set SE, and his new
subscription by SN . The members of these sets are services.
These services can be divided into 3 groups, shown in Figure 4.6. SE \ SN are the
services no longer subscribed to: the subscriber needs to be removed from these.
SN \ SE are the new services to which the subscriber was previously not subscribed
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Algorithm 1 Add New Subscriber
1: procedure AddSubscriber(subscription, userId, userKey)
2: userGroup← MatchSubscription(subscription)
3: if userGroup = ∅ then . no matching user group
4: userGroup← NewLkhTree
5: AddSubscription(userGroup, subscription)
6: userGroup.Insert(userId, userKey) . userId joins userGroup
7: for all service ∈ subscription do
8: service.Insert(userGroup) . authorise new group for this bouquet
9: end for
10: else . found matching user group
11: userGroup.Insert(userId, userKey)
12: for all service ∈ subscription do
13: leafNode← service.FindLeafNode(userGroup)
14: leafNode.Rekey
15: end for
16: end if
17: end procedure
and must be added. SE ∩ SN are services which the subscriber has retained. These
do not need to be updated.
4.6.4 Unsubscribe
When a subscriber is removed entirely, the user group containing the subscriber
needs to be rekeyed, as well as all associated service groups. Algorithm 2 shows
the operation: the user node is looked up with an identifier and removed from its
group key-tree on lines 2 and 3. This removal triggers a rekey operation in that tree
from the node where the user’s key was located. Then on lines 4 to 8 all constituent
services of the associated subscription are rekeyed from the leaf nodes associated
with the user grouping that contained the now removed subscriber.
4.7 Multicast Rekey Message
The format of the key update message as multicast by the key server is shown in
Table 4.2. The total size of the message for a key update is 54 bytes.
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SE \ SN
SN \ SE
SN ∩ SE
SE
SN
Figure 4.6: Difference in subscription sets when changing selection. Any services
in the intersection of these two sets do not need to be rekeyed when a subscriber
changes from existing subscription SE to new subscription SN .
Algorithm 2 Remove Subscriber
1: procedure RemoveSubscriber(userId)
2: userGroup← UserGroupForId(userId)
3: userGroup.Remove(userId)
4: subscription←Subscription(userGroup)
5: for all service ∈ subscription do
6: leafNode← FindLeafNode(userGroup)
7: leafNode.Rekey
8: end for
9: end procedure
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Each key node is assigned a globally unique identifier. This identifier will not be
reused across key trees. When an update message is transmitted, it includes the
identifier of the key being updated, and the identifier of the key that can used to
decrypt it. The identifier does not change when the key is updated. Associated with
each key is a version identifier that is incremented each time the key is updated.
Size (bytes) Name Description
1 type Update type (key data or one-way)
1 count Number of individual key updates in this message
. . .
4 updateId ID of updated key
4 updateV er Version of updated key
4 decryptId ID of key used to encrypt payload
4 decryptV er Version of key used to encrypt payload
16 iv Initialisation Vector
16 payload Encrypted Payload:
(16) updatedKey Updated Key (AES 128-bit)
. . .
4 crc CRC 32-bit Checksum
54 Total Size
Table 4.2: Rekey Message Format
When using the LKH+ technique for joins, the decryption key information, initiali-
sation vector, and payload are omitted. Therefore the size of a key update on a join
is reduced to 14 bytes.
A CRC checksum is used to verify the integrity of the message. In practice this will
be applied to the entire payload of a UDP packet, which might contain multiple
individual key updates. In the prototype implementation a single key update is
transmitted per UDP packet for simplicity.
It is assumed that for added security the multicast network infrastructure prevents
clients from sending information to the multicast group. Therefore it can safely be
assumed that messages are from the key server. If this is not the case, a signature
needs to be added to the message for integrity verification and source authentication.
Denial-of-service attacks could otherwise be made possible by the intentional distri-
bution of bad key update messages that would corrupt the keys stored by clients.
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In the scenario where the multicast network is not secured against client multicast
transmissions, no circumvention of the system’s security would be possible (apart
from the denial-of-service already mentioned).
Each LKH+ group is assigned to a separate multicast group. Depending on sub-
scriber distribution characteristics and network infrastructure, this can reduce net-
work load. Primarily, however, it ensures that clients do not receive key updates
related to groups they are not interested in.
4.8 Client Processing of Key Updates
A client will decrypt an update message if it holds the correct key and version that
was used to encrypt it. Additionally, the client will retain update messages for keys
that it already holds but for which it does not hold the appropriate decryption key.
These retained messages will be reprocessed after receiving additional keys.
The logic is shown in Algorithm 3: on lines 2 and 3 the existing key and the key
necessary to decrypt the update message are looked up. If the client does not hold
an existing key with the same ID as that being updated in this message, but does
hold the decryption key, the update message is decrypted and retained on lines 13
to 18. This represents a new key being received by the client.
Alternatively, if the client does hold an existing key with a matching ID, then the
update message is processed further only if the version is newer than that of the
existing key (line 5). In that case, if the correct decryption key is held (line 6)
then the message is decrypted and the updated key contained therein replaces the
existing one on line 8. If an appropriate decryption key is not held, the complete
message is retained for processing later, after more keys have been received (line 10).
This would occur if an update was missed or received out of order.
4.9 Key Recovery Fallback
The following protocol is defined for client-initiated unicast communication with the
key server. This is used when the subscriber initially comes online, and subsequently
in the event that the client determines it has missed some keys and needs to request
retransmission.
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Algorithm 3 Client Processing of Key Update Message
1: procedureKeyUpdate(decryptId, decryptV er, updateId, updateV er, payload)
2: existingKey ← KeyWithId(updateId)
3: decryptKey ← KeyWithId(decryptId)
4: if existingKey 6= ∅ then . key is held by subscriber
5: if updateV er > Version(existingKey) then
6: if decryptKey 6= ∅ and Version(decryptKey) = decryptV er then
7: updatedKey ← Decrypt(payload)
8: retain updatedKey
9: else . keep to try again later
10: retain decryptId, decryptV er, updateId, updateV er, payload
11: end if
12: end if
13: else . key is not held by subscriber
14: if decryptKey 6= ∅ and Version(decryptKey) = decryptV er then
15: newKey ← Decrypt(payload)
16: retain newKey
17: end if
18: end if
19: end procedure
U → S : U
S → U : 〈K〉UPK where K is the set of keys required by U
The client establishes a TCP connection to the server and identifies itself. The server
responds by sending the updated keys, encrypted with the pre-shared symmetric key
UPK. The client can discard any previously held keys and retain this new set of
keys.
4.10 Optional Batched Updates
The solution incorporates the possibility to transmit key updates in batches. When
a subscriber joins, any changes to keys in the tree are deferred until later (when a
batch of updates is processed at once). The associated nodes in the tree are simply
marked for update. The subscriber is sent the current group keys (together with
62
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
K789K456K123
K3K2K1 K7K6K5K4 K9K8
GK
Figure 4.7: Batched Updates: Key updates are deferred at the time of join/remove.
Nodes are marked for later processing. When the next batch is run they will be
updated and transmitted in this order: K2, K123, K4, K6, K456, GK.
the necessary intermediate keys). For removal of subscribers, the changes are also
deferred. In that case, no keys need to be transmitted. When the batch is run, the
tree is processed from the leaf nodes towards the root.
Figure 4.7 shows how nodes are marked for batch updates. In that example, the
leaf nodes containing K2, K4, and K6 are marked for rekeying. The intermediate
nodes K123 and K456 are also marked along with the group key GK. When the
batch is run, each of the intermediate keys and the group key is updated only once
as opposed to multiple times if each rekey operation had been performed separately.
Note that batch updates impact on backward and forward secrecy. The operator
can define a maximum time period tm between batches that is suitable for their
business model. Then subscribers who join or are removed will not be able to access
content that was transmitted earlier than tm before they joined, or later than tm
after they are revoked.
4.11 Multicast Group Security
Additional protections can be added at the Internet service provider’s multicast
network level. Specifically, an ISP possesses sufficient information to associate a
particular endpoint in the network with a particular subscriber. This information
could be used to restrict access to multicast groups based on the subscription asso-
ciated with that endpoint.
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Figure 4.8: Vaults for applications A1 and A2 are encrypted by the kernel with
KA1 and KA2 respectively. GPRIV, the kernel’s Global Private Vault is encrypted
by hardware with Khw.
A restriction of this type would mean that an attacker who holds a legitimate sub-
scription but is illegitimately redistributing content would not only have to redis-
tribute decryption keys but also the encrypted content itself. This is because anyone
who is not a legitimate subscriber would not be able to join the multicast groups
used to distribute the encrypted services, even if they received the keys through
some illegitimate means. This would prevent illegitimate users “piggy-backing” off
the legitimate network.
4.12 Secure Storage with Application Vaults
We propose an approach inspired by VAULTS [31] (described in Section 3.7) that
can be used to cryptographically separate and protect data belonging to different
applications on a STB or mobile device. As in Section 4.5.2, we assume the device is
running a “trusted kernel” — that is, one that is verified by hardware before being
loaded.
The operating system must provide an API for applications to write to a per-
application “vault”. The encryption and decryption of this vault is performed on
behalf of the application by the kernel. The key used for this is not available to the
application.
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The kernel stores a key for each application, along with cryptographic hashes of the
associated application executable, in a global private vault. The kernel must verify
the application’s integrity by using the cryptographic hash before allowing access
to the application’s vault. The global private vault is encrypted with a unique key
built into the device’s chip. Depending on the hardware support, the kernel itself
might not even be able to gain direct access to this key. A device supporting this
functionality would be sufficient to allow secure storage of keys from the CA system.
Figure 4.8 depicts an example association between vaults for a system consisting of
two applications, A1 and A2. Each application can store data in their respective
vaults. The kernel is responsible for transparently encrypting and decrypting the
contents of the vault as they are passed to and from the application, after verifying
their signatures SigA1 and SigA2 respectively. The encryption keys KA1 and KA2
are held in the global private vault, GPRIV , and known only to the kernel. In turn,
the GPRIV vault is encrypted by hardware with Khw.
4.13 Summary
In this chapter we have presented our proposed solution for the design of a Con-
ditional Access system for IPTV. The system is designed to scale with number of
subscribers and services. Each service is encrypted with an independent group key
to reduce the impact of any single compromise. Further, our system allows an opera-
tor to offer different subscription packages to users and to cryptographically protect
these packages in such a way that a subscriber with decryption keys for one package
is unavailable to view other packages to which they are not subscribed.
Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, describe the design of our key hierarchy,
refreshment scheme, and groupings of subcribers and services.
In Section 4.5, we presented a protocol for initial establishment of a key shared only
between the key server and the receiving device. Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 describe
the key server operations, multicast rekey message structure, and client operations
that are required for our system design. A fallback protocol for recovery of missed
key updates by a client is listed in Section 4.9.
In Section 4.10 our implementation of batched key updates is described. Finally,
Section 4.12 describes an approach to securing the persistent storage of keys on
end-user devices, particularly those that run third-party software applications.
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Chapter 5
Results and Evaluation
5.1 Testing Methodology
A prototype implementation was used to conduct experiments, primarily to assess
the scalability and practical feasibility of the system. The implementation is de-
scribed in Section 5.2.
To generate experimental data for each test, a number of initial subscribers, N , with
random subscription choices were successively added to the system. Thereafter, for
bandwidth tests, the simulation randomly adds and removes subscribers in a ratio of
9:1 until the subscriber count reaches 2N . The simulation uses 50 services divided
evenly into 5 bouquets, unless otherwise specified. The subscription choice for a
given subscriber is a random selection of between 1 and 5 of the bouquets. A degree
of 4 was used for key trees, unless otherwise specified.
Tests were designed to assess total memory usage of the prototype server applica-
tion and how it varies as the system scales. These results are shown in Sections
5.3 and 5.4.
In Section 5.5, performance of the two alternative methods for growing a full tree
(as described in Section 4.3) was analysed by counting total key updates, and the
weight of those updates. Weight was determined by counting the number of users
that need to receive a particular update message.
Total bandwidth was measured outgoing from the key server and averaged for the
number of add and remove operations performed in the experiment. This is shown
in Section 5.6.
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Section 5.7 shows the system scalability from the client’s perspective. Consideration
is given the total number of keys that a subscriber must hold, and the average
number of key updates that the client must process when a subscriber is added or
removed. Finally, the effects of batched key updates on bandwidth are shown in
Section 5.8.
5.2 Implementation
A C++ prototype of the conditional access system consisting of client and server
components that implement the aforementioned communications protocols and key
management scheme was developed. A simulation application provides the server
with multiple join and leave requests to collect experimental data.
The simulation bypasses the IP networking interface by directly triggering a large
number of joins and leaves within the server module. A sample of the total clients
added are simulated to monitor their key processing and storage.
For practical use, multicast client and server modules were implemented using the
BSD Sockets API. A separate multicast group is associated with each group key
(ie. LKH+ tree), and with each service’s data stream. The data stream generated
for each service consists of random or patterned data. It is expected that practical
use of the system would require integrating the key server mechanism with a robust
media streaming library such as Live555 [25].
All key update messages are encrypted with AES-128 in the Cipher-Block-Chaining
mode of operation (AES-192 and AES-256 can optionally be used with the associated
increase in key storage on the server and transmission of updated keys). A randomly
generated initialisation vector is transmitted along with each encrypted key update
message. For simulation purposes, key establishment is achieved by sending a unique
symmetric key to each client. This is used for further cryptography operations.
MD51 is used as a one-way function to transform a 128-bit AES key into another
128-bit key for “LKH+”. All cryptographic functions are provided by the OpenSSL
[30] library.
1MD5 was chosen somewhat arbitrarily for the purposes of the prototype implementation. The
MD5 algorithm has known flaws and it is expected that a production implementation would prefer a
more suitable algorithm. Such a choice should consider the the availability of hardware acceleration
for these algorithms on the targeted platforms. The use of a different hashing algorithm will not
affect the algorithmic complexity of the proposed group rekey operations.
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Experiments were performed on an Apple MacBook Pro with a 2.66 GHz Intel
Core i7 processor and 8 GB of RAM.
5.3 Server Memory Consumption
The graph in Figure 5.1 shows the memory consumption of the server application
as the number of initial subscribers increases to 50,000. Memory consumption is
measured using the Mach kernel’s task info()2 utility function. Total resident
memory of the process is sampled once per every 1,000 users that are added. The
observed memory consumption was consistent across multiple runs.
The graph shows linear memory memory consumption, O(N) for N subscribers, as
is expected. The actual total is approximately 14.5 MB for 50,000 users (degree 4).
Projecting this to 10 million subscribers, as an approximation of a large operator,
memory usage would be 2.9 GB which is can easily be accommodated in a suitable
server’s random access memory. Inflections in the graph are visible at approximately
14,000 and 35,000 subscribers. The implementation does not alter it’s behaviour at
these points. The prototype implementation makes use of C++ Standard Template
Library (STL) containers. In particular, these are used for managing portions of
the simulation that would not be present in a real implementation. The observed
inflections appear to be due to additional memory being allocated for STL vector
objects when their initially allocated capacity is exhausted.
Figure 5.2 shows how total memory consumption is related to degrees of the LKH
trees. It is expected that a higher degree has lower memory consumption because
fewer intermediate nodes are required. The server process was run for each of the
degrees from 2 to 16 and 50,000 subscribers were added. Minimum memory usage
was found to be achieved with a degree of 6, which uses 25% less memory than a
binary tree. Contrary to expectations, further increases to the degree see the mem-
ory usage starting to increase approximately linearly. It was observed that even
tree degrees use less memory than the adjacent odd degrees. Note that the imple-
mentation does not behave differently for odd or even degrees and the number of
allocated nodes. The observed increase and the difference between odd and even
degrees are due to wasted memory caused by the C++ runtime’s memory manage-
ment alignment rules in combination with the prototype implementation’s frequent
and numerous dynamic memory allocations. Using a memory pool could reduce or
2http://web.mit.edu/darwin/src/modules/xnu/osfmk/man/task_info.html
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Figure 5.1: Server Memory Consumption for Varying Numbers of Subscribers
eliminate wasted space and cause the actual memory allocation to follow the total
number of nodes as expected. This unexpected memory usage should therefore be
considered an artifact of the prototype implementation and is not significant with
respect to assessing the
The total number of nodes N in a single full tree of height h and degree d is given
by the standard formula:
N =
1− dh+1
1− d
Where the height h for n members is given by:
h = logd n
Figure 5.3 compares the total number of nodes allocated for 50,000 subscribers to the
number that would be needed for a single tree. The graph shows that increasing the
degree causes the total number of nodes to tend towards the minimum required which
would be 50,000 nodes (no intermediate nodes). The overhead of additional keys to
support the multiple service architecture is shown to be approximately constant and
minimal. This is because of the system property that restricts a subscriber to exactly
one grouping. Dividing N subscribers amongst multiple trees uses approximately
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Figure 5.2: Server Memory Consumption for Varying Degrees of the LKH Trees
the same number of nodes as a single tree containing all N subscribers. The minimal
overhead comes from the nodes comprising the service trees and does not present a
scalability problem.
5.4 Effect of Service Groupings
Figure 5.4 shows the effect of varying numbers of bouquets. The memory usage
increases exponentially: O(2n) for n bouquets. This is as expected due to the 2n−1
possible combinations of bouquets that a subscriber may choose from. The linear
projection on the graph demonstrating the na¨ıve service grouping approach was
calculated by multiplying the size of tree containing all subscribers by the number
of bouquets for the datapoint.
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of varying numbers of services. The mean results of two
runs of the simulation were used to produce this graph. The increase in memory con-
sumption with increase in the numbers of services is negligible (for realistic numbers
of services relative to the number of subscribers). The only overhead from adding
an extra service is the associated key tree, which is relatively small compared to
the user grouping trees. The minimal absolute memory consumption and the very
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Figure 5.3: Total Nodes to support 50,000 subscribers for varying degrees of the
constituent trees. Compared against the number of nodes for a single tree of 50,000
subscribers.
gradual slope of the graph that is apparent indicates that the proposed system is
highly scalable with number of services. The inflection visible at 60 services is not
significant: it is combination of the few runs performed and the random customer
behaviour of the simulation.
Bouquets allow a large number of services to be made available in a flexible manner,
since memory consumption for a given number of bouquets is linear with increase
in the number of subscribers. However, it is only practical to use a small number of
bouquets.
If more flexibility is required, for example a large number of bouquets, or completely
flexible service selection, then using the na¨ıve service grouping method as discussed
in Section 3.4.1 will be more efficient. In that case, users would be members of mul-
tiple groups, each of which are either associated directly with a service, or with a
bouquet. The implementation does not simulate this, but linear memory consump-
tion is projected onto the graph in Figure 5.4 and shows that memory consumption
of the na¨ıve approach matches the proposed technique for 15 bouquets.
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Figure 5.4: Server Memory Consumption for Varying Numbers of Bouquets.
50 services are divided evenly amongst these bouquets. For n bouquets, there are
a possible 2n − 1 service groups. Also shown is an approximation of linear mem-
ory consumption for the “na¨ıve approach”. For n > 15, this becomes more space
efficient than F-PPC.
It should be noted that the numbers and graphs for varying numbers of bouquets are
dependent on the distribution of services amongst bouquets and the rules or trends
for subscribers’ selections. In the simulation, bouquets are non-overlapping and
subscribers choose some or all of them. If bouquets are primarily overlapping, for
example for different levels of subscription (“Compact”, “Standard”, “Premium”),
subscribers will choose only one or a few and the exponential memory usage would
not be seen.
5.5 Comparison of Tree Growth Operations
To assess differences in performance between the two approaches to growing a full
tree (splitting leaf nodes and subtree insertion) 50,000 members were added to a
single tree and the total number of key updates were counted. Figure 5.6 shows
that subtree insertion results in fewer total key updates than splitting leaf nodes.
This improvement is due to the single update message required to replace the group
key when the tree grows in the subtree insertion approach.
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Figure 5.5: Server Memory Consumption for Varying Numbers of Services. Ser-
vices are divided evening amongst 5 bouquets.
Additionally, for each update the number of users that require the key is calculated.
This is the “weight” of the key update. Fewer users affected by a key update is
preferable. Subtree insertion performs marginally better in this case too, as shown
in Figure 5.7. This is because new subscribers are inserted into subtrees that are
initially empty and so joins after a grow operation affect fewer existing subscribers.
The minor inflections in this graph are again the result of simulated variability of
subscriber behaviour. Apart from such minor fluctuations, results were consistent
across successive runs.
While the subtree insertion operation supports rapidly growing the tree, as presented
in this thesis it does not cater for shrinking the tree again in the case of a large
number of members being removed. While memory associated with user keys is
freed when those users are removed, the structure of intermediate nodes remains.
The performance in this case will be worse than O(logdn) for a tree containing n
members. In fact it will be O(logdm), where m is the maximum number of members
that was previously held by the group.
With the leaf nodes splitting approach, if all siblings of a particular leaf node are
removed, the intermediate parent node can be eliminated to shrink the tree (this was
not implemented). The tree will become unbalanced, and rebalancing the tree is non-
trivial and potentially expensive in terms of key updates. In this implementation,
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Time
Total (s) Average (msec)
Subtree Insertion 3.83 0.077
Leaf Node Splitting 25.97 0.519
Table 5.1: Time to insert 50,000 subscribers.
the leaf node to split is chosen from the shortest subtree. Finding the shortest
subtree causes the leaf node splitting operation to be time consuming relative to the
subtree insertion approach.
5.6 Bandwidth
Bandwidth usage was calculated by increasing the number of subscribers from 50,000
to 100,000, with randomized adding and removing of subscribers in a 9:1 ratio. This
simulates a pay-TV operator that is growing overall, with a 10% rate of turnover.
Total data sent by the server is divided by the total number of add and remove
operations. The results are shown in Table 5.2. The average data required to
deliver key updates for add or remove operation using LKH trees is 13.35 KB or 4.8
KB when using LKH+ key-trees.
These figures can be compared against unicast distribution of a group key to all
subscribers, or equivalently, multicasting the group key to all users encrypted with
their UPK. A single add or remove operation with 100,000 subscribers would require
transmitting 5,272 KB per group key, assuming the same update message size. This
could be reduced to 1,367 KB for joins by using a one-way function. The bandwidth
savings of using the proposed solution is many orders of magnitude, allowing more
frequent updates to be performed.
These size calculations are based on the key update packet format defined in Sec-
tion 4.7 and exclude the size of UDP and IP packet headers. This represents all out-
going key updates from the server, including initial unicast delivery to subscribers.
All keys are transmitted only once, with no batched updates.
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Average Update Size (KB) Total (MB)
Add Remove Combined
LKH 13.21 14.57 13.35 817.3
LKH+ Joins 3.71 4.81 294.7
Table 5.2: Update Size per Add/Remove Operation. The average values were
calculated by dividing the total size of transmitted data by the number of add and
remove operations. Total shown is the bandwidth required to increase subscribers
from 50,000 to 100,000.
5.7 Client Operations
Due to the time performance of simulating a large number of clients, a 1% sample
of the total number of subscribers is monitored. Fewer total subscribers were used
for these experiments. The results presented are the average of two runs of the sim-
ulation which results in some inflections in the graphs due to the random simulated
subscriber behaviour. The absolute values and general trends of the graphs were
considered in this analysis.
The average number of keys stored by a client and the average number of updates
that a client has to perform per add/remove operation are determined. Graphs are
shown for varying numbers of subscribers, services, and bouquets.
Figure 5.8a shows that the average number of keys held by a user increases linearly
with the number of services. The same is true for the number of key updates that
a user needs to make for a single add or remove operation, on average. This is
shown in Figure 5.8b. A subscriber belonging to a system with 100 services will
need to hold approximately 185 keys (2.9 KB for 128-bit AES keys), which is well
within the storage capabilities of any receiver device (including the storage capacity
of a smartcard). The user has to perform approximately 47 symmetric decryption
operations for an add/remove operation.
As the number of bouquets increase the number of subscriber groups increase, and
therefore the size of the service trees increase too. A single bouquet is a special case
in that all subscribers will be members of a single group, and they will also need to
hold keys for all services. For other cases, a linear increase is shown in the average
number of keys held by a user (see Figure 5.8c).
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Apart from the special case of a single bouquet, the number of key updates performed
by a user is constant with an increasing number of bouquets. This is because a user
is restricted to a single service group, which is some fixed combination of bouquets.
Figures 5.8e and 5.8f show that client key operations and number of keys held are
constant for increasing numbers of subscribers. In fact, the number of keys held
by a subscriber within a particular tree is given by log4n, however for the ranges
of subscribers being considered the differences are negligible and outweighed by the
number of service tree keys that a subscriber must hold.
5.8 Effect of Batched Updates
The implementation supports an optional batch mode. The effect of batched up-
dates on outgoing server bandwidth and client operations was tested by varying the
number of add/remove operations per batch. Figure 5.9 shows that bandwidth ini-
tially reduces significantly as batch size increases, then flattens out for a batch size
of about 300. At that point the multicast group updates have reduced to almost
zero, and the remaining bandwidth usage is for initial unicast transmission of keys
to joining members.
Similarly, the average number of key updates that a client has to process drops
significantly with increase in batch size as shown in Figure 5.10. Note that for any
single batch update operation, the number of key updates that a client processes
will not be reduced from that of a non-batch operation (and may in fact be slightly
greater).
These results show that use of even moderately sized batches result in an appre-
ciable reduction in bandwidth overhead. In a pay-TV environment, dependant on
subscriber turnover rates and subscription periods, batches could be run daily or
every few days.
5.9 Results Analysis and Summary
The simulation makes use of a simplified and somewhat artificial model of customer
behaviour, with randomness introduced by a pseudo-random number generator. The
objective of the simulation was to ascertain the basic viability and scalability of the
proposed design for practical implementations. For this purpose visual analysis of
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(f) Updates Processed as Subscribers Vary
Figure 5.8: Average Keys Held and Updates Processed by a Client
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Figure 5.9: Effect of Batches on Outgoing Server Bandwidth. Data transfer re-
quired to increase subscribers from 50,000 to 100,000, with 10% turnover.
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
K
ey
U
p
d
at
es
Batch Size
1000–2000 services, 50 services, 5 bouquets
Figure 5.10: Effect of Batches on Average Number of Keys Processed by Clients
per Add/Remove operation.
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the graphed results was deemed sufficient and so detailed statistical analysis of the
results was not performed.
Some undesirable inflections are visible in the graphed data, particularly in the client
operations graphs. These are due to the limited number of simulations runs that
were used to produce the data. The running time for simulating the computational
operations of clients is significant and it was impractical to perform many runs for
each datapoint. However for the stated objectives, the collected data is sufficient to
demonstrate the operation of prototype system.
In Section 5.3, the memory consumption of the key server was assessed. It was
observed to scale linearly with an increase in number of subscribers, as expected. The
results of varying the degree of the LKH tree were unexpected. They demonstrated
the need for careful memory management in a real implementation to avoid non-
optimal memory alignment causing wasting space.
In Section 5.4, the overhead in memory consumption required to support the pro-
posed multiple-service architecture was shown to be more efficient than the na¨ıve
approach for fewer than 15 bouquets. Also in this section, we showed that the group-
ing of subscribers into groups sharing different group keys incurs minimal overhead
compared to all subscribers sharing a single group key.
Two alternative methods of expanding a full LKH tree were compared in Section
5.5. Our proposed “fast-grow” operation was shown to have a marginal improvement
over the standard approach.
In Section 5.6 the average size of key updates was shown to be significantly improved
by the use of LKH+ over LKH. This will be true of an environment with more
subscribers joining than leaving, on average. The cost of client processing and
storage was considered in Section 5.7.
Finally, batched key updates were shown in Section 5.8 to provide a significant
reduction in number of key updates and associated bandwidth, even for small (50
to 100) batch sizes. A practical implementation should definitely consider the use
of batching updates.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The distribution network of a pay-television operator is protected cryptographically
by means of a conditional access system. Such a system is responsible for sharing
keys with authorised subscribers and provides a mechanism for updating those keys
on a regular and timely basis to allow the subscribers to view content. The system
needs to support large numbers of users and services for the pay-TV application. The
key contribution of this thesis is to address the design of an end-to-end framework
for a conditional access system in an IPTV environment.
Group key management techniques are applied to this problem. A prototype imple-
mentation produced experimental results that demonstrate it is possible to success-
fully develop a workable framework, which is usable as the basis for a commercial
CA system. The implementation is highly scalable with number of subscribers and
number of services. This is achieved by dividing services into a small number of
groups that are treated as atomic units of subscription. This coincides with bou-
quets, an existing convenience mechanism in digital television for grouping services.
Subscribers are grouped according to their selection of bouquets. While this does
place restrictions on the flexibility of customers’ choice, it is in-line with pay-TV op-
erators’ and their content providers’ business practices — namely, bundling services
to subsidise those that are of interest to a smaller audience with those of interest
to a larger audience. This method improves upon an existing technique which sup-
ports completely flexible service selection but is only practical for a small number
of services.
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Additionally, the solution enforces subscription selections cryptographically. Sub-
scribers can only decrypt those services for which they are authorised, as opposed
to using a single key shared amongst all subscribers for all services — an approach
which would only exclude non-subscribers and would depend on receiver software
enforcing subscription selections.
An efficient and novel technique for growing full key trees was proposed that im-
proves upon the performance of the standard technique.
The protocols that have been designed and presented do not require a smart card
as a secure storage mechanism. A protocol for establishing a secret key shared
between the server and an untrusted client was presented. All that is required is a
trusted system that can verify the integrity of authenticated code and assure that is
guaranteed not to disclose keys. The system is flexible enough to support video-on-
demand content encrypted per-user and an extension supporting multiple devices
per subscription was proposed.
6.2 Summary of Contribution
This thesis has presented a detailed consideration of the end-to-end requirements
for designing a practical IPTV Conditional Access system. The specific, unique
contributions of this research are as follows:
• A proposed collusion attack on the F-PPC key refreshment scheme [41]. This
attack was presented in Section 3.3.6.
• A modification to the F-PPC multiple service architecture was presented in
Section 4.4. This modification addresses the problems of scalability with in-
crease in number of services that are present in that scheme (identified in
Section 3.4.2).
• A fast key tree “growth” operation to increase the size of a full LKH+ [32] key
tree that reduces the total number of key update messages and the number of
messages that a receiver has to process over other techniques. This operation
was described in Section 4.3.2.
• The design of a protocol for initial establishment of a key shared only between
the key server and a receiver device, given in Section 4.5.
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• The combination of LKH+ group rekeying with the aforementioned multiple-
service architecture to support multiple services, each with independent en-
cryption keys, divided into bouquets to allow subscriber choice. The key server
operations, format of the multicast rekey message, and details of client pro-
cessing of key updates were given in Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, respectively.
• “Application vaults”, for securing persistent key storage on receiver devices,
based on the “VAULTS” cryptographic access control scheme [31], was de-
scribed in Section 4.12.
• The implementation of a prototype CA system and simulation framework to
assess the viability of a practical implementation of our proposed system. The
scalability of the system was assessed with respect to varying numbers of
subscribers, services, and bouquets. Additionally, the effect of batched key
updates was considered. The implementation details were given in Section 5.2
and analysis of the experimental results in Chapter 5.
6.3 Directions for Future Work
6.3.1 Software
Additional work on the software would require developing more comprehensive net-
working code, integration with a proper subscriber management system that possibly
incorporates direct sign-up, integrating the server and client with a media stream-
ing framework such as the Live555 libraries [25] (which support RTP, RTCP, and
RTSP), modification to comply with the DVB-IPTV standard, and general perfor-
mance and robustness improvements.
6.3.2 Green Technology
The current global trend is towards energy saving and “green” technology. From
both a legislated and ethical standpoint, developing devices such as set-top-boxes
that have minimal power consumption is highly desirable. A critical component of
this is the standby power consumption of a device. That is, how much power it uses
when in standby mode.
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In the European Union, for example, legislation states that electrical devices sold
after December 2012 should use no more than 0.5 Watts in standby mode (or 1 Watt
if they display information such as a clock when in standby) [13].
This places restrictions on the operation of a set-top-box. Typically, satellite set-top-
boxes in standby only disable their video and audio outputs and otherwise maintain
full connections to the satellite network. This is in order to receive software updates,
altered programme schedules, and most importantly, group key updates and other
entitlement information. If such a set-top-box is properly powered-off for any period
of time (often only possible by physically unplugging it), once turned on again it
often takes quite a while to start descrambling video. This is because of the carousel
fallback mechanism that is in place for recovering after missed key updates. In any
system with no return-path, the only way to distribute potentially missed keys to
clients is to continuously broadcast them.
The design of the conditional access system therefore has direct implications on
the power usage and environmental impact of a set-top-box. While these power
savings for a single set-top-box might seem insignificant, cumulatively they are very
significant. A multiple-tuner, high-definition satellite PVR might use as a much as
100 Watts when operating. If this is reduced to 1 Watt when in standby, a savings of
99 Watts is achieved. Assuming the majority of set-top-boxes are in standby for 90%
of their lifetime1, in a network with 5 million subscribers a total power reduction of
495 MW is possible – almost a third of the total power generation capacity of the
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station.
Maintaining a STB network connection and other processing functions with less than
1 Watt of power is not feasible with current technology. It should therefore be clear
that any stateful conditional access system needs to rely on a fallback mechanism
to supply missed key updates to devices that have been off or in standby. The time
complexity of the aforementioned carousel mechanism is O(n), for a system with
n subscribers. In practice this creates a bad user experience as the waiting period
for a system with a realistic subscriber base can be up to an hour – a very poor
user experience if this occurs every time the STB is turned on. Overcoming this
might require a reduction in the frequency of key updates, potentially resulting in
a reduction of the security of the system.
In an IPTV network, a return path is available. A reliable fallback method is
therefore for a client to establish a unicast connection to the key server and request
1This assumes that households watch 2 hours of television per day, on average.
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the latest group key. However, dependant on the frequency of key updates, this will
degrade to the situation where all clients need to establish a fallback connection
every time they are powered on. This will negatively impact network bandwidth
and place extremely high demand on the server.
A stateless conditional access system would avoid many of these problems. Additions
or modifications to a technique such as SDR that accounts for the poor performance
in the case of removed users would be a good direction for future work. Academic
research in this area is on-going [48].
6.3.3 Network Simulation
More comprehensive network simulation with a system such as NS-3 would be rel-
evant if detailed information about a real topology was available. This would need
to include the operator network, ISPs and other intermediate service providers, end
users’ networks, and so forth. Such a simulation would allow measurements of traffic
flow, and more accurate simulation of failures
6.4 Final Remarks
This research has successfully highlighted some primary problem areas in conditional
access and has proposed workable solutions to address these problems. There is much
scope for future work in extending the solution, and in fact in the greater problem
of end-to-end content security.
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Glossary
AES Advanced Encryption Standard.
CA Conditional Access.
CAS Conditional Access System.
CW Control Word.
DRM Digital Rights Management.
DTT Digital Terrestrial Television.
DVB Digital Video Broadcasting.
DVR Digital Video Recorder.
ECM Entitlement Control Message.
EMM Entitlement Management Message.
FTA Free-To-Air.
FTV Free-To-View.
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol.
IPTV Internet Protocol Television.
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4.
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6.
LAN Local Area Network.
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MLD Multicast Listener Discovery.
PKI Public-Key Infrastructure.
PPV Pay-Per-View.
PVOD Push-Video-On-Demand.
RTCP Real-time Transport Control Protocol.
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol.
RTSP Real Time Streaming Protocol.
SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation.
SKDC simple key distribution centre.
STB Set-Top-Box.
TCP Transmission Control Protocol.
UDP User Datagram Protocol.
VOD Video-On-Demand.
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